Inequality aversion to posterity:discounting human lives by Parouty, Mehraj Bin Yasaar
  
 University of Groningen
Inequality aversion to posterity
Parouty, Mehraj Bin Yasaar
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2013
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Parouty, M. B. Y. (2013). Inequality aversion to posterity: discounting human lives. Groningen: s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Inequality Aversion to Posterity:
Discounting Human Lives
Inequality Aversion to Posterity:
Discounting Human Lives
M.B.Y. Parouty
Copyright c 2013, Mehraj B.Y. Parouty
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
No part of this book may be reproduced
in any material form, whether by publication, translation,
storage in a retrieval system or transmission by electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or other means,
without written permission of the owners of the copyright.
ISBN 978-90-367-6425-4
9 789036 764254
ISBN: 978-90-367-6427-8 (E-book)
RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN
INEQUALITY AVERSION TO POSTERITY:
DISCOUNTING HUMAN LIVES
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de
Wiskunde en Natuurwetenschappen
aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
op gezag van de
Rector Magnificus, dr. E. Sterken,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
vrijdag 13 september 2013
om 16:15 uur
door
Mehraj Bin Yasaar Parouty
geboren op 21 maart 1982
te Port Louis, Mauritius
Promotor: Prof. dr. M.J. Postma
Beoordelingscommissie: Prof. dr. B.W. Lensink
Prof. dr. R. Sanderman
Prof. dr. A. Salhi
Paranimfen: Rika(H) A. Katerborg-van Dijk
Paul G. Journe´e
Contents
1 General Introduction 7
I The Need for Differential Discounting 13
2 Ethical Debates and Proposed Resolutions 15
2.1 Health investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.1 Measures of health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.2 Ethical CEAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 An extreme example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1 Overview of approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Motivation matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.a Appendix: Pathogenesis cervical cancer (Stanley (2010)) 31
3 The Social Discount Rate 39
3.1 The Ramsey discount rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1.1 Ramsey brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Ramsey rate for health? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.1 The marginal substitution between health and
wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 A differential rate for health . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.1 Components of the Ramsey rate . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1
4 Questionnaire Development 57
4.1 Problem framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.1.1 Question formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.2 Response types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Rule rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.3 Preliminary data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.a Appendix: Final questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5 Empirical Evidence 77
5.1 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
II A Framework for Differential Discounting 95
6 Differential Discounting 97
6.1 Discounting dynamism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.2 Dynamics denotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.3 Denouement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7 A Relaxation of Invariance 109
7.1 A covariance representation of coordinate transfor-
mations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.2 A derivation with commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.3 An illustration in welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.3.1 An application in health economic evaluations123
7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.a Appendix: Sraffa’s production for subsistence ap-
proach to health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8 Probability Measures 135
8.1 Distribution derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.1.1 Probability assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.1.2 Differential equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.1.3 Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
2
8.1.4 Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.2 Probability of the future monetary value of health . . 146
8.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.a Appendix: The Poisson process . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
9 An Aspiration Avenue 157
9.1 Utility and aspiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
9.1.1 The Probabulity concept . . . . . . . . . . . 160
9.1.2 The Aspiration utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
9.2 Temporal aspiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9.2.1 The marginal monetary value of health . . . 164
9.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
9.a Appendix: An illustration on discounted life-expectancy169
10 General Discussion 177
3
List of Figures
3.1 Graph from Ramsey’s ”Mathematical theory of sav-
ing” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1 Annual discount rate for money() and health() plot-
ted against time of delay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.2 Annual discount rate for money plotted against time
of delay. Female(/) respondents are compared to
male() respondents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.3 Annual discount rate for money plotted against time
of delay. Respondents who are optimistic () are
compared to pessimistic (?) respondents. . . . . . . . 84
5.4 Annual discount rate for health plotted against time
of delay. Respondents belonging to the upper 50%
regarding health status (.) are compared to those be-
longing to the lower 50% regarding health status (). 85
10.1 Space-Time discounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4
List of Tables
2.1 Country specific discount rates for costs and health . 20
2.2 Step-wise discounting approaches proposed in liter-
ature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Overview of different discounting approaches intro-
duced above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Discounted health outcomes of HPV vaccination . . 27
5.1 Partitioning of overall sample set in mutually exclu-
sive subsets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2 Linear regression fits on the discount rate for money
(r =  + t) and 95% confidence intervals, C.I.’s . . 86
5.3 Linear regression fits on the discount rate for quality
of life (r =  + t) and 95% confidence intervals,
C.I.’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5

Chapter 1
General Introduction
Animals, including human beings, generally prefer to consume now
than to consume in the future. Primates, such as Saguinus oedi-
pus, for example, are known to act as though they discount1 future
consumption (Rosati et al, 2006). Among the human species, the
concept of interest rate, for example, is common, interestingly, even
among children. A hundred euro note in a bank account today is
generally accepted to be more valuable than the same euro note
in, say, one year’s time. Consideration of such a characteristic by
economists began early in the history of their discipline, with scot-
tish economist John Rae’s Sociological theory of capital in 1834.
Rae (1834) first set the scene by assuming that decisions were guided
by pure reason, without any emotional and/or psychological mo-
tives, such as impatience or diminishing marginal utility2. With that
foundation, he then sequentially considered the psychological mo-
tives as they became apparent. Such economic foundations for in-
tertemporal choice however lost consensus when Paul Samuelson
(1937) introduced the discounted-utility (DU) model with a 5-page
1A future consumption is devalued compared to a current one.
2Utility is a measure of pleasure, derived from consuming. Diminishing marginal
utility means that the pleasure derived from consuming an extra grape, say,
decreases as we consume more grapes.
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article in which he condensed the many conflicting psychological
motives into a single parameter, the discount rate. Unanimity of the
model was immediate and prevails until today. Needless to say that
the axiomatic derivation of the DU model has been numerous (Fish-
burn, 1970, Koopmans, 1960, Lancaster, 1963, Meyer, 1976, Rubin-
stein, 2003).
An important assumption of the discounted utility model is that the
discount rate is positive and invariant across time and across all
forms of consumption. The assumption of a rate that is invariant
across different types of consumption is central in time preferences;
otherwise we would have a certain time preference for, say, kiwis
and a different time preference for grapes, say. And the assumption
of a rate that is invariant across time implies that plans are consistent;
otherwise the plans that we make today will constantly be changing
as we move into the future. Although Samuelson (1937) was skeptic
about the validity of the DU model, its prevalence is largely due to
it’s simplistic nature and wide range of applicability (Frederick et al,
2002).
The beginning of the 80’s has seen the inclusion of such a discount
rate for human lives. It is well known, however, that the practice of
discounting human lives, assuming invariance, impacts heavily on
cost-effectiveness analyses of different types of projects. In 1991,
for example, the asbestos regulation issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was overuled by the U.S. Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals [See 947 F.2d (5th Cir. 1991)] where the judges
wrote: ”Because the EPA must discount costs to perform its evalua-
tions properly, the EPA should also discount benefits to preserve an
apples-to-apples comparison, even if this entails discounting bene-
fits of a non-monetary nature”.
With regards to the use of a single and only social discount rate, SDR,
such decisions have spurred much debates over the last few decades.
European bodies such as the CvZ (“College voor Zorgverzekerin-
8
gen”) in the Netherlands, NICE (National Institute of Clinical Excel-
lence) in the UK, SMC (Scottisch Medicines Consortium) in Scot-
land, TLV(“Ta ndvards-och LakemedelsformansVerket”) in Sweden
and KCE (“Kennis Centrum”) in Belgium – just to arbitrarily name
some – all design, discuss and revise the equitability of their guide-
lines with regards to discounting human lives (CvZ , 2013, ISPOR,
2013, KCE , 2013). However, with majority of guidelines prescrib-
ing a single SDR, the bias for cures to be cost-effective compared to
preventions is not minimised. In an attempt to bring guidelines in
phase with ethics, this thesis is two-fold.
First, I argue that the government should protect our rights as well
as the rights of our children, although possibly unborn yet, and the
rights of our grandchildren and so on. To that end, policies ought to
be drafted so as to include methodologies for valuation of medical
interventions that are, as far as possible, unbiased with regards to
cures or preventions; while keeping in mind, of course, that valua-
tions are typically carried out in the present time. Although there
have been several attempts towards fair cost-effectiveness analyses,
the lack of their normative validity has resulted in a lack of consen-
sus. I provide a theoretical argument for differential discounting of
health outcomes and back up the argument with empirical results
from a representative sample of the Dutch population.
Second, I propose to extend current economic theory to allow for
differential discounting. I pave way for an economic system that
relaxes the invariance assumption by considering an n-commodity
economy where each commodity has a specific discount rate func-
tion. I formulate a model-consistent expectation by borrowing from
a concept of Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Next, I add
probability measures to each constituent of the system, based on
current psychological theory, and discuss the marriage of the de-
terministic system coupled with a probabilistic measure for each of
its constituents. With such a framework, other possible implemen-
tations are valuing life improving and life saving interventions dif-
9
ferently by implementing differential discounting between life years
and quality of life.
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Chapter 2
Ethical Debates and Proposed
Resolutions
1 Priority setting is necessary for efficient resource allocation. The
latter, however efficient it be, should nonetheless be within ethical
norms. The 60’s and 70’s have seen a lot of supply constraints by
budget allocators. Health Statistics of the European Commission
also noted that hospital bed supplies have reduced by over one mil-
lion over the past 20 years in EU25 (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=t
ps00046). Certainly, it is not feasible to provide all possible health-
care interventions that can conceivably be of some benefit. Hence,
recent attempts to aid the efficient allocation of resources have been
considerations of cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs) and broader
full-blown health technology assessments (HTAs). However, poli-
cies prescribed for discounting of health are known to narrow the
choices of medical interventions with an unequal hand.
1Based on
WESTRA TA, PAROUTY MBY, BROUWER WB, BEUTELS PH, ROGOZA
RM, ROZENBAUM MH, DAEMEN T, WILSCHUT JC, BOERSMA C AND
POSTMA MJ. (2012) On discounting health gains from Human Papilloma
Virus Vaccination Value in Health, 15, pg 562-567
PAROUTY MBY, BOERSMA C AND POSTMA MJ (2013) Discounting human
lives: A critique submitted
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Majority of bodies prescribe a discount rate for health equalling that
of costs; NICE (2008), for example suggests a discount rate of 3.5%
for both costs and health outcomes. However, regardless of the type
of medical intervention, costs are generally borne immediately but
occurances of health gains extend through broader time horizons.
Moreover, interventions having immediate health gains are direct
competitors with interventions that have future health gains. Keep-
ing everything else constant, such as thresholds for cost-effectiveness,
the impact of discounting health outcomes is greater for programmes
that have different time profiles for costs and health effects, such as
vaccines.
Examples of the impact of discounting on cost-effectiveness ratios
are numerous. A recent study on the cost-effectiveness of a hy-
pothetical Helicobacter pylori vaccine has shown that when using
the 1999 Dutch guidelines with a discount rate of 4% for health ef-
fects, the vaccine is deemed cost-ineffective while the current dis-
count rate of 1.5% favours the cost-effectiveness of the vaccine a lot
more (De Vries et al, 2009). Hence, there is, on average, a general
cost-effectiveness bias for cures compared to preventions (Brouwer
and van Exel , 2004, Keeler and Cretin, 1983, Smith and Gravelle ,
2001). This could simply be restated as “cure is better than preven-
tion”, reminding us of a quote from Karl Popper (Miller, 1985) that
“in the realm of errors, cure is better than prevention”.
The choice of discount rates affects not only the Net Present Value
(NPV) of an intervention but also, since there are many such feasible
interventions, affects a whole portfolio of interventions; especially
the optimal portfolio of health interventions. And this portfolio, in
turn, affects the optimal allocation of available budgets by decision
makers who will indefinitely have a huge bundle of curative inter-
ventions in the allocation problems. Since the degree of attempt to
avert future illnesses seems to indicate that future costs of curative
interventions, in turn, will never fall, I wonder whether the assump-
16
tion of equal discount rates can simply be restated as being inside
“the realm of errors”.
2.1 Health investments
Health economists generally view health economic evaluations as health
investments. A health technology assessment typically involves a
comparison of competing programmes (Drummond et al , 2005,
Gold et al, 1996, Simoens , 2009). By comparing two or more
programmes, differences in costs and health outcomes can be es-
timated. This comparison can be summarized in a, so-called, incre-
mental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). This ICER is calculated by
dividing the estimated difference in costs by the estimated differ-
ence in health outcomes. By judging this ICER to a relevant thresh-
old, decision-makers can subsequently be informed regarding the
desirability of funding a certain intervention. Guidelines of vari-
ous countries, amongst which the Netherlands (CvZ , 2013), specify
how such evaluations should be carried out and what discount rates
to use.
2.1.1 Measures of health
The types of health investments fall into three main categories: a
long term health investment such as different types of vaccination
programs, a short term health investment such as cancer interven-
tions and most curative interventions and finally, a continuous in-
vestment such as an annual screening programme for type-2 dia-
betes (Bos et al, 2005). Health gains provide the justifications to-
wards considering the undertaking of an intervention. Several mea-
sures for such complex health utility gains have been devised. The
notion of QALY, quality adjusted life year, is well-known today by
all health economists. It is composed of the two parts, QA, “quality
of life” and LY, “life year”. These QALYs form the ‘return’ part of
the investment and money forms the ‘cost’ part of the intervention.
17
The cost-effectiveness ratio is obtained by adequately discounting
and subsequently comparing the two: present discounted costs and
present discounted effectiveness.
An alternative attempt to measure health is to recognise that health
cannot realistically improve indefinitely. Some economists thus made
attempts in minimising disutility, i.e. by how much our health state
fall short of perfect health. A recent concept towards this has been
the introduction of the “burden of disease”. These are measured,
often, using DALYs, disability adjusted life years, introduced in the
early 1990’s. The DALY differs from the QALY primarily in that
it includes an age-weighing factor and represents a negative quan-
tity (to be minimised rather than QALYs that are maximised) (Sassi,
2006). These DALYs would be discounted at their respective rates
and the best program would be chosen. However, the issue always
remains that by discounting health effects through time, the weights
of future health gains from the vaccination program are effectively
decreased compared to those of the curative intervention. As a re-
sult, it has been suggested that vaccines might warrant a different
approach.
Recently, a novel measure for the return part of the cost-effectiveness
analysis has been proposed. Bos et al (2005) argued that risk re-
duction can be translated into an effectiveness measure in the cost-
effectiveness ratio as risk reduction will ultimately reflect a rise in
life expectancy. Such an approach takes into account the fact that
the instant that health gains occur needs not coincide with the instant
that risk reduction occurs and also takes into account other benefits
such as herd immunity. They proposed to discount the health ben-
efits of vaccines only for the period between vaccination time and
the moment that the infection is prevented. The time between infec-
tion and actual health gains is not discounted. This ’time-shifted’
discounting approach is discussed, in more detail, in section 2.2.
Such attempts are purposefully to improve outcomes of evaluations
of preventive interventions.
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2.1.2 Ethical CEAs
While the dominant equal discounting of costs and effects is firmly
based in normative economic theory, the fact that ICERs of preven-
tive interventions are especially influenced by discounting, has led
some to argue for specific discounting rules for preventive interven-
tions; aiming to limit the devaluation of future health gains (Tasset et
al, 1999). Beutels et al (2008), for example suggested that vaccines
might warrant the application of a different discounting approach for
health outcomes. Although a lower discount rate for health is gen-
erally argued to lack the theoretical motivations, attempts have been
consideration of a rate that, at least, decreases with time. Several
approaches have been proposed in this context. Step-wise discount-
ing (which may be viewed as a discontinuous form of hyperbolic
discounting), for example, starts with discount rates that discontin-
uously decrease after specific time intervals. Other authors have ar-
gued that empirically observed rates of time preference would be
more informative (Asenso-Boadi et al, 2008, Bobinac et al, 2011,
Cairns , 1994, Lazaro , 2002, Olsen , 1993, West et al, 2003).
Importantly, it is repeatedly observed that discount rates in empirical
studies decrease with increasing time horizon, potentially approach-
ing, for example, a hyperbolic function (Harvey , 1995, Loewen-
stein and Prelec , 1992). This is generally the case regardless if
respondents are explicitly asked to adopt a societal perspective or
an individual perspective (Asenso-Boadi et al, 2008, Bobinac et al,
2011, Meerding et al, 2010). Hyperbolic discounting generally re-
flects preferences of individuals that are impatient today but project
to become more patient in the future, which is the common observed
behavior. It is, however, important to note that observed discount
rates are typically high; consequently using such alternatives would
result in less favourable cost-effectiveness ratios of preventive in-
terventions, especially since the discount rates for costs are usually
given and fixed. Discounting of costs is fairly undisputed in the
context of economic evaluations. Often, the exact discount rate for
19
costs is informed by real returns on riskless government bonds. Ta-
ble 2.1, below, provides discount rates for costs and health from
various guidelines.
Table 2.1: Country specific discount rates for costs and health
Country Discount rate
Costs Health
Austria 5% 5%
Belgium 3% 1.5%
Canada 5% 5%
England & Wales 3.5% 3.5%
France 0; 3; 5% 0; 3; 5%
Germany 5% 5%
Switzerland 2:5; 5; 10% 2:5; 5; 10%
Sweden 3% 3%
The Netherlands 4% 1.5%
United States 3% 3%
With regards to empirical discount rates, health economists are more
concerned with the general decline of the rate function with time
rather than the level of discounting. Declining rates suggest that
ethical norms could be settled, although not with regards to the near
future but to the distant one. Therefore, it has been recommended
to use such discount functions for informative purposes in economic
evaluations (for example, in sensitivity analyses), also in the Dutch
context (Rutten-van Molken et al, 2000). Such choices can ob-
viously impact relevantly on cost-effectiveness ratios of preventive
interventions (Cairns and van der Pol , 1997). Preventive interven-
tions, especially those with outcomes occuring furthest in time com-
pared to timing of costs, are the most affected by discounting of
health gains. Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination can be con-
sidered as one of the most extreme examples of such a program,
where the major health gains occur approximately 30 years after ini-
tial vaccination.
20
2.2 An extreme example
Since averted cases of cervical cancer occur about three decades af-
ter the vaccination, cost-effectiveness of HPV-vaccination has re-
cently gained quite some attention in many countries regarding whether
or not to fund (large scale) vaccinations. Attempts to improve out-
comes of health evaluation have, however, been numerous. Al-
though this intervention is disease specific, different discounting ap-
proaches can nonetheless importantly indicate the weight that future
health outcomes of vaccination programmes receive in an evalua-
tion (Mangen et al, 2010, Rogoza et al, 2009).
This variation should provide the reader with a clear illustration of
the impact of adopting different approaches to discounting health
effects. Because the health outcomes related to HPV vaccination are
expected to occur several decades after the initial vaccination, the
number of QALYs gained by HPV vaccination is highly sensitive
to the discounting method that is applied (Cairns , 2006, Rogoza
et al, 2009). In the current example, my colleagues and I illustrate
the impact of different guidelines on future health outcomes and,
consequently, on the cost-effectiveness of HPV vaccination.
2.2.1 Overview of approaches
For the purpose of our illustration, we shall use a previously pub-
lished in-house Markov model for HPV-infection (Rogoza et al,
2009). We investigate five different discounting approaches, and fo-
cus on changing discount rates, and approaches for health effects. To
keep the results tractable, we will not vary the discount rate for costs
in the current study (which will be set at 4% according to Dutch
guidelines), but primarily highlight differences in the NPV of health
effects based on different discount approaches and rates. In setting
specific limits to the range of discount rates, we stayed in line with
the Dutch guidelines. Below we highlight the different approaches
used for QALYs in this study.
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Constant discounting approach
Constant discounting approach is well-founded in economic the-
ory, and reflects a generally accepted and commonly used discount
rule for future costs and health outcomes in health-economic evalua-
tions (Keeler and Cretin, 1983). Letting w(t) be the weight attached
to an outcome occuring at time t and r be the constant discount rate
per unit time2, the discount weight is given by
w(t) =
1
(1 + r)t
(2.1)
By using the constant discounting approach, future costs and health
outcomes are devalued at a constant rate from the moment that the
intervention (e.g. the vaccination) took place. A discount rate for
costs of 3-5% is most often used, internationally. Most countries
prescribe an equal discount rate for health effects ( e.g. 4% for costs
and 4% for effects). The reason for this is especially to avoid incon-
sistencies (Claxton et al, 2006, Keeler and Cretin, 1983). Moreover,
health effects represent a monetary value, and therefore, applying
two different discount rates has often been dismissed as being in-
consistent. I will, however, discuss the consistency argument, in
more detail, in chapter 6.
Empirical discounting approaches
In contrast to the constant discounting approach, empirical studies
typically show that the rate of time preference declines over time,
both from an individual and a societal perspective (Cairns and van
der Pol , 1997, van der Pol and Cairns , 2000, 2001). This was
recently confirmed for health effects, as well, in a meta-regression
analysis by Asenso-Boadi et al (2008). In particular, the rate of time
preference for a short-term delay (e.g. 5-year) was approximately
25% which decreased to approximately 3.5% for a long-term delay
(e.g. 100-year). Such alternative discounting approaches have been
2Yearly time intervals are most common.
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proposed to better reflect observed time preference. Two prominent
examples of such decreasing rates are
hyperbolic discounting
w(t) =
 
1
(1 + gt)h=g
!
(2.2)
and proportional discounting
w(t) =

b
b+ t

(2.3)
where h; g; b and  are parameters reflecting the time preference for
the future (Cairns and van der Pol , 1997, Harvey , 1995, Loewen-
stein and Prelec , 1992). In equation 2.2, h, reflects the individual’s
preference for the future or timing in general. An individual does
not have any time preference (i.e. a discount rate of 0) if h = 0;
by increasing h the preference for the present increases. Parameter
g determines how much the function differs from the constant dis-
counting model (van der Pol and Cairns , 2010), with g = 1 resulting
in the constant discount model. Proportional discounting (equation
2.3) has been proposed by Harvey (1995). The parameter, b, reflects
the magnitude of the time preference and  determines the shape of
the curve. Initially, Harvey suggested that  should be 1 but others
have introduced different values for . For example, Cairns and van
der Pol (1997) estimated that the proportional discounting model
would fit empirical data best if  is 1.5.
We will fit the proportional and hyperbolic discounting approaches
by varying the values of the variables to minimize the sum of the
squares and maximising the explanatory power (reflected in r2 ) as
reported by Asenso-Boadi et al (2008). In particular, for the hy-
perbolic discounting approach the values of h and g are estimated at
0.32 and 0.29 (r2 = 0.9988), respectively. For the proportional dis-
counting approach the values for b and  are estimated at 3.4 and 1.1
(r2 = 0.9988), respectively.
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Stepwise approaches
In the step-wise discounting approach, several constant discount rates
are used in decreasing order for different periods. Typically, step-
wise begins with a constant rate but this is lowered in consecutive
time periods (The graph of rate against time looks like a flight of
stairs). Table 2.2 shows the discount rates and time intervals as men-
tioned by Bazelon (2002), Beutels et al (2008) and the UK Treasury.
With regards to the latter, note that in the static HPV model that we
used, the time horizon of our analyses was set at 100 years, and so
the minimum discount rate applied will be 2.5%.
Table 2.2: Step-wise discounting approaches proposed in literature
UK Treasury Beutels et al (2008) Bazelon (2002)
Time(Years) r(%) Time(Years) r(%) Time(years) r(%)
0 to 30 3.5% 1 to 5 4% 0 to 10 3.5%
31 to 75 3.0% 6 to 25 3% 11 to 20 1.5%
76 to 125 2.5% 26 to 75 2% > 20 0%
126 to 200 2.0% 76 to 300 1%
201 to 300 1.5% > 300 0%
> 300 1.0%
Discount rates and time intervals highly differ among different sources.
For the UK, the time intervals after which the discount rate de-
creases with 0.5% were based on empirical data (Oxera , 2002),
and a normative framework was the starting point of the analysis.
The other two papers were more focused on proposing methods to
‘improve the outcomes’ of economic evaluations of preventive pro-
grammes. Bazelon (2002) recently proposed to decrease the dis-
count rate relatively rapidly, so that more weight would be attached
to future health. In their proposal, the discount rate reaches 1.5%
after no more than 11 years. As a comparison, in the UK Treasury
(2013), this discount rate was not reached until after 200 years.
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Time shifted approach
Specifically for vaccines, also in an attempt to improve outcomes
of evaluations of preventive interventions, it has been proposed that
the health outcomes might be discounted from the moment of risk
reduction (i.e. averted infections) instead of from the moment that
health is actually gained (Bos et al, 2004, Drummond et al, 2007).
Bos et al (2004) argued that, in the case of a vaccination programme,
the health outcomes of preventing an infection is undervalued due
to discounting because, for some infectious diseases, the delay be-
tween the initial infection and disease development can be several
years. Therefore, they recommended the time shifted discounting
approach, by which health outcomes are discounted from the mo-
ment the infection was prevented and not from the moment, for ex-
ample, life years are actually gained.
Although this method has been used by others as a pragmatic dis-
counting approach, an exact underpinned normative rationale for it
has not been given. Furthermore, one might argue that by using this
discounting approach, some basic principles of discounting, such
as accounting for the uncertainty in the period after the infection
is prevented, are violated. We used this method with two different
discount rates in the period where discounting is required according
to the method; a 4% discount rate and a 1.5% discount rate. QALY
losses due to cervical cancer were thus only discounted in the period
between vaccination time and the moment of HPV-infection.
2.2.2 Results
All five discounting approaches were applied to the health outcomes
of our in-house Dutch HPV model. This model predicts the inci-
dence of cervical intraepithelial neoplasia and cervical cancer in-
cidence with and without HPV vaccination, reflecting the current
Dutch situation. The implementation of HPV vaccination for the
full cohort of 12-year-old Dutch girls (i.e., cohort size was set at
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Table 2.3: Overview of different discounting approaches introduced
above
Approach Name Description
1 Constant Discount rate is constant over time (equa-
tion 2.1), can be uniform or differential
2 Step-wise Discount rate step-wise declines after spe-
cific time intervals (table 2)
3 Hyperbolic Discount rate declines gradually over time
(equation 2.2)
4 Proportional Discount rate declines gradually over time
(equation 2.3)
5 Time-
shifted
Time period between vaccination and pre-
vention of infection is discounted rather
than full period up to actual QALY gains
100,000) resulted in an undiscounted lifetime gain of 2907 life-years
or 3462 QALYs. The total undiscounted costs of implementing HPV
vaccination to the Dutch National Immunization program (Rijksvac-
cinatieprogramma) were e31.5 million (e30.9 million discounted)
and resulted in e11.5 million undiscounted cost offsets (e2.8 mil-
lion discounted).
Applying the different discounting approaches, of course, resulted
in different numbers of discounted QALYs gained by HPV vaccina-
tion (Table 2.4). The time-shifted discounting approach resulted in
the highest present value of QALYs while the proportional discount-
ing approach resulted in lowest estimate. Obviously, this result is
driven by the relatively high discount rates in the latter method (i.e.
much higher than 4%). In the time shifted discounting approach
(Bos et al, 2004) , health outcomes of HPV vaccination were only
discounted at a constant rate for the period between vaccination and
infection, and in other periods a zero discount rate was applied.
When the stepwise discounting approach was applied, the total num-
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ber of discounted QALYs were comparable to those obtained at
a constant rate of 3%. Note that the total number of discounted
QALYs is sensitive to the time interval and decline in discount rate.
When the conventional constant discounting approach was applied,
the present value of QALYs gained was highly sensitive to the cho-
sen discount rate. Lower discount rates for health outcomes resulted
in substantial increases in total number of discounted QALYs gained
with HPV vaccination.
To give an indication of the impact of these different approaches on
the final ICER, we also combined these results with the discounted
costs (4%). It should be noted that we do this mainly for illustra-
tive purposes and that it might not always be logical to combine our
results on health gains with a cost-estimate, discounted using a 4%
constant rate. In particular, if one prefers an empirically based ap-
proach such as hyperbolic discounting for health effects, it is likely
that one also wishes to discount costs on a similar basis, that is, using
a hyperbolic discount function. The results on QALYs and ICERs
are, nonetheless, shown below.
Table 2.4: Discounted health outcomes of HPV vaccination
Discounting approach QALYs gained ICER(e/QALY)
Undiscounted 3462 7600
Constant 1.5% 1423 18400
Constant 3% 715 37000
Constant 4% 438 59100
Proportional 164 165400
Hyperbolic 160 164500
Step-wise* 718 36800
Shifted uniform 4% 2117 13200
Shifted differential 1.5% 2811 9400
HPV= human papillomavirus; ICER= incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio; QALY=quality adjusted life-year
* As proposed by the UK Treasury.
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According to Dutch guidelines (constant discount rates of 4% for
money and 1.5% for health; i.e. differential discounting between
money and health), we found an ICER ofe18,400 per QALY gained
for HPV vaccination. Furthermore, varying the discount rate for
health effects from 0% to 4% resulted in estimated ICERs ofe7,600
to e59,100 per QALY, still using constant discounting. When we
applied the proportional discounting approach to health effects, we
found an ICER that was nine times higher than the benchmark of
18,400 per QALY gained. Ergo, extremely large and relevant dif-
ferences in the ICER were found between the various approaches
investigated, moving from extremely cost-effective up to extremely
cost-ineffective (when compared with commonly cited thresholds).
2.2.3 Discussion
Proportional and hyperbolic discounting approaches are important
as they reflect individual and societal time preference for health out-
comes (Cairns and van der Pol , 1997). Although their use cannot be
acknowledged without context, it is informative to apply them more
frequently in economic evaluations, for instance in sensitivity analy-
ses (Bleichrodt and Brouwer , 2000). This is also interesting, since
the approach of differential discounting, as prescribed in the Nether-
lands, and the proportional and hyperbolic discounting functions,
more or less, represent extremes, in terms of outcomes. Thus, their
use in sensitivity analysis would be informative for decision makers.
The different methods, however, highlight the issues and ongoing
discussions in the literature. For these alternative discounting ap-
proaches, the devaluation of the health outcomes was both depen-
dent on the parameter values used in the discounting approaches and
the nature of the approaches themselves. Obviously, when the health
outcomes were devalued less, this resulted in a more favourable cost-
effectiveness for HPV vaccination. The recommendation to care-
fully identify appropriate discount methods and rates, and to inves-
tigate the sensitivity of results to the application of alternative dis-
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counting approaches, holds even stronger if vaccination programs
are considered with health effects occuring far into the future.
2.3 Motivation matters
Although discounting health is subject to ethical debates (Bos et al,
2005, Brouwer et al, 2005, Brouwer and van Exel , 2004, Claxton
et al, 2006, Coyle and Tolley , 1992, Frederick et al, 2002, Grav-
elle et al , 2007, Keeler and Cretin, 1983, Klok et al, 2005, van
Ballegooijen et al, 2010, Weinstein and Stason, 1977), most coun-
tries suggest to discount effects with a constant discount rate equal
to that of costs (commonly of around 3-5%) (ISPOR Guidelines ,
2012, Smith and Gravelle , 2001). In general, it seems important
for decision making and guideline prescribing bodies in different
jurisdictions to have transparent, defendable and reasoned discount
rules. The constant discounting approach is well founded in eco-
nomic theory, and remains the generally accepted and recommended
discounting approach. It (purposely) does not reflect commonly ob-
served declining time preference of individuals, as this avoids time
inconsistent behaviour in policy making.
While the different discounting approaches are informative, it must
be noted, however, that some approaches have a better normative un-
derpinning (e.g. constant uniform) while others are based, solely, on
empirical studies (hyperbolic and proportional discounting). Some
other approaches (e.g. the stepwise approaches proposed by Beu-
tels and colleagues and that proposed by Bazelon and colleagues,
as well as the shifted approach by Bos and colleagues) lack both
yet (Bazelon , 2002, Beutels et al, 2008, Bos et al, 2004). Their
motivations seem especially based on the dissatisfaction with the
‘devaluation’ of future health in economic evaluations of preventive
interventions. While this may be a poor motivation for alternative
methods, it does highlight potential problems in the standard method
that assumes a constant discount rate, equal for both costs and health
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outcomes. In general, it seems inappropriate to change the method-
ology applied in evaluations on such a basis. Therefore, as consen-
sus would have it, majority of bodies prescribe the standard model
that assumes an invariant discount rate.
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2.a Appendix: Pathogenesis cervical can-
cer (Stanley (2010))
Cervical cancer is the second most common cancer worldwide. In-
fection with the Human PapillomaVirus (HPV) is a prerequisite for
cervical cancer, and the persistence of the infection is especially im-
portant. In particular, infection with one of the oncogenic types of
HPV may develop into cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) of
grades I III and ultimately into invasive cancer. Major oncogenic
serotypes are 16, 18, 31, 33, 45, and 52. Of these serotypes, HPV
16 and 18 have shown to be responsible for approximately 70% of
cervical cancer cases worldwide.
In the Netherlands, HPV infection peaks are found in women aged
20 25 years. Although most women are able to clear the infec-
tion within one year, some of them will develop persistent infection.
Women can develop CIN I III and cervical cancer after some years
of persistent infection. In the Netherlands the average age of cervi-
cal cancer is estimated between 40 45 years.
Currently, highly effective prophylactic HPV vaccines are available.
HPV vaccines are most effective if administered to women who are
HPV negative. Therefore, women should be vaccinated before they
become sexually active. Most developed countries decided to im-
plement HPV vaccination of girls aged 12-years in National immu-
nization programmes.
Health benefits following HPV-vaccination comprise of prevention
of cervical intraepithelial neoplasia or development of cervical can-
cer. These health benefits are expected to occur approximately 20
and 30 years after the initial immunization, respectively.
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Chapter 3
The Social Discount Rate
1 The use of a unique constant discount rate for all types of con-
sumption is a central assumption in the standard model of intertem-
poral choice, the discounted-utility (DU) model, first introduced by
Samuelson (1937). While children are familiar with the concept of
interest rate, a term that economists often use is the socially effi-
cient discount rate. Socially efficient discount rates are proxied in
three different manners: the rate observed in financial markets re-
vealing society’s willingness to transfer wealth to the future, the
marginal rate of return on productive capital in the economy and
the welfare-preserving rate of return on savings. The three differ-
ent proxies are, however, known to be fully compatible with each
other when consumption plans are optimized and credit markets are
frictionless (Gollier, 2012). Such simplifying assumptions are ubiq-
uitous internationally. In order to ensure proper motivations of their
projects, international guidelines for economic evaluations prescribe
a devaluation of future benefits, monetary or non-monetary, using
such a rate.
1Based on
PAROUTY MBY, BOERSMA C AND POSTMA MJ (2013) Discounting human
lives: A critique submitted
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3.1 The Ramsey discount rate
Majority of economists have adopted the Ramsey (1928) discount
rate, r, for that matter. Ramsey (1928) assumed that any individual
should aim to maximise his/her utility. He considered the two possi-
ble scenarios; indefinitely increasing enjoyments or enjoyment rate
that asymptotically approaches a certain fixed limit. It seemed rather
logical that utility cannot increase indefinitely and the preferred as-
sumption was that an individual should aim to attain Bliss. With a
given income, which is a function of labour and capital, an individ-
ual can only consume now or save for future consumption and the
whole problem was to seek the optimum balance between the two.
3.1.1 Ramsey brief
Briefly, the intuition behind Ramsey’s calibration of r is as follows.
Suppose that we were given a bag full of grapes and were to de-
vise an optimal consumption plan for our primate friend, Saguinus
oedipus. The grapes can be consumed immediately, or they can be
planted to produce trees, yielding more grapes, in the future; i.e.
grapes are a form of capital yielding a benefit for the future. More-
over, if s grapes are saved for the future, then they yield f(s; T )
grapes in the future. Suppose that an initial cost s units of grapes
per capita will yield a sure benefit R = s(1 + rd) units of grapes
per capita after 1 time period, where rd is the rate per unit time. A
natural continuous function for f(:) is thus obtained:
f(s; T ) = s(1 + rd)
T
= s lim
4T!0
(1 + rd4T )
T
4T
= serT
where r is the continuously compounded growth rate. Since a unit
of grape per capita invested in the primate feeding project, will yield
erT units of grapes per capita in the future, with certainty, we can
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transfer grapes through time by investing in our own primate feeding
project. Thus, a simple arbitrage argument deduces:
f 0(s) = erT (3.1)
Now, let q0 and qT denote the quantity of consumption today and
in the future, respectively. The primate can be assumed to derive
pleasure solely by consuming and it evaluates it’s lifetime utility
as U(q0; qT ). Assuming that we are given an initial endowment of
q0 = Q0 grapes today, if s grapes are planted, the primate can con-
sumeQ0 s immediately. The quest to find how much of our grapes
we should plant is similar to the problem that Ramsey wished to
tackle: ”How much of it’s income should a Nation save”?
Supposing that the primate consumesQ0 s, then the lifetime utility
is given by U(Q0   s; f(s; T )). It is generally assumed that, given
one riskless asset and one risky asset, the fraction of wealth opti-
mally placed in the risky asset is independent of the level of initial
wealth. Such an assumption hardly seems unacceptable. The utility
function, U(:), thus assumes that the relative risk aversion is con-
stant. The only utility function with such a feature is the isoelastic
utility function:
U(q) =
q1 "
1  " (3.2)
Now, the optimal consumption plan is characterized by the tangency
of the feasibility frontier (the set of feasible consumption in both pe-
riods) and the indifference curve. Then, the increase in future con-
sumption when one extra unit of grape is invested in the productive
capital of the primate feeding project, measured by the gradient of
the feasibility frontier, should equal the marginal rate of substitution
between current and future consumption at the optimum consump-
tion plan. Also, because of decreasing marginal productivity of cap-
ital, the feasibility frontier is concave. The first order condition of
the problem of maximizing U(Q0 s; f(s)) with respect to s is thus
f 0(s) = @U(q
0;qT )=@q0
@U(q0;qT )=@qT
.
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Ramsey, however, did not advocate a rate for impatience; a famous
quote from Ramsey (1928) reads as follows: ”It is assumed that we
do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones,
a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from
the weakness of the imagination”. Years following Ramsey’s paper,
however, economists included such a rate. A technical definition
for the latter is the minimum interest rate that induces people to save
when their income profile is flat; i.e. the rate of impatience, , serves
merely to value a future consumption impatience-free. So, our first
order condition becomes
f 0(s) =
@U(q0; qT )=@q0
e T@U(q0; qT )=@qT
(3.3)
We now bring the different equations of this section together. We
first equate 3.3 with 3.1 and then plug in the parameters from 3.2
and we are done. That is
erT =
@U(q0; qT )=@q0
e T@U(q0; qT )=@qT
 ! r =   1
T
ln
@U(q0; qT )=@q0
@U(q0; qT )=@qT
(3.4)
From equation 3.2, we find U 0(q) = q ". So,
r =   1
T
ln

QT
Q0
 "
Defining the growth rate of consumption between dates 0 and T to
be g so that QT = Q0egT , we can write
r = + g" (3.5)
NICE (2008), for example, prescribes r = 3:5% for both costs and
health effects, based on the allocation of the numericals  = 1:5%,
g = 2% and " = 1, recommended by the UK Treasury (2013).
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3.2 Ramsey rate for health?
Given that savings receive interest r on capital, Ramsey showed that
optimum saving is given by the simple rule: “The rate of saving mul-
tiplied by the marginal utility of money should always equal to the
amount by which the total net rate of enjoyment of utility falls short
of the maximum possible rate of enjoyment”. Therefore, assum-
ing economic growth, an individual should aim in finding the best
proportion between current consumption and future saving. With
Ramsey’s assumptions being whithin realistic realm, it seems that
there is need for discounting to take into account the marginal sub-
stitution between the present and the future.
However, when health effects are concerned, our valuations tend to
require value judgements from both moral and philosophical points
of views. Past philosophers have often argued that ”life is priceless”.
Yet, valuing a human life in monetary terms is, in some way, tagging
a price onto our lives. While a zero discount rate for health implies
that similar weights be attached to both current and future health
effects, a procedure which seemingly has the acceptable required
ethics, decision makers would argue that programs with large annual
costs and moderate health effects would also appear cost-effective
since the weights assigned would favour ‘effectiveness’ more than
‘costs’.
This could inflate the portfolio of feasible interventions thus raising
the opportunity costs of non-selected programs. Noting that decision
maker’s major role to be an efficient resource allocator entails distri-
bution of resources such that output is maximised per unit cost while
minimising opportunity costs of non-selected programs, it would
seem that priority setting difficulties might then be expected. As a
means to aid priority setting, given a fixed budget constraint, the dis-
count rate of health outcomes that is typically prescribed generally
equals to that of costs (such as, for example, NICE (2008)) given the
assumption of invariance in the DU-model and the marginal substi-
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tution between health and wealth.
3.2.1 The marginal substitution between health and
wealth
As with the discounted utility model (Frederick et al, 2002), the the-
oretical framework for discounting health is however largely “due to
its simplicity and it’s resemblance to the familiar compound inter-
est formula, and not as a result of empirical research demonstrating
its validity”. One of the fundamental financial principles states: ”A
dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow”. Whether the
same principle holds true for health effects is, however, debatable.
When we consider a financial bond, for example, yielding a cer-
tain amount of dividends in the future, the quantitative measurabil-
ity of the income streams generally do not pose any problems in the
discounting procedures. However, there seem to be quite a lack of
consensus regarding the very quantification of health effects. The
general topic of discounting health effects consists mainly of two
parts namely a methodological part which is derived mostly from
the financial literature and a subjective part which is much debated.
Economists such as Brouwer and van Exel (2004), for example, ar-
gue that we first of all have to create consensus on qualitative deci-
sion rules rather than on the actual rates.
Several investigations have been carried out as an attempt to under-
standing the rates of preference for health and wealth and their exact
relationship (Cairns and Van Der Pol, 1997, Chapman and Elstein,
1995, Viscusi, 1996). The marginal transferability of wealth and
health seems to be a touchstone for the choice of the discount rate to
be applied for health. Money is generally known by economists as
the most liquid asset. But assuming a perfect transferability would
also imply that health is as liquid as money. A prime requirement in
investigating the relationship between health and wealth is thus the
very liquidity of health effects.
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The marginal substitution between health measures and money thus
appears questionable. Recently, Robert Stonebraker (http://faculty.
winthrop. edu/stonebrakerr/book.htm) stated that ”If the price of a
hamburger rises, I switch to chicken .... substitution is the key”.
When goods are mispriced, the law of demand and supply forces
the price to stabilise so that all goods are in their proper respective
equilibrium. But whether health effects have got any substitutes or
whether health can actually be priced is a matter of delicate moral
values and philosophy.
3.3 A differential rate for health
The specific nature of a human life, as opposed to other commodi-
ties includes the indivisibility of a life year in a sequence of life
years gained and the dependence of life years within the sequence.
In particular, one cannot live an individual life year without living
the previous one; i.e. the subsequent life year is dependent on the
previously lived ones and, as such, life lived is indivisible (It is not
without reason that one refers to ”a life” because, for example, one
cannot live half of the previous life year) (Bos et al, 2006). If life
years are dependent and indivisible it would not be adequate to dis-
count a sequence of life years gained by one individual year by year,
rather, one ought to discount the whole composite of accumulated
years once, from the start of the sequence back to the moment of
implementation of the project being investigated. Such an aspect
again motivates the use of a decreasing or even zero discount rate
within the sequence of dependent life years.
The specificities of health thus do not allow for an assumption of a
single rate. Although attempts to aid the ethical valuation of future
health have been propositions of different discounting approaches,
seen in chapter 2, the lack of motivation for differential discounting
has, thus far, mirrored on a lack of consensus. Most governments
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suggest a one and only discount rate for both health and costs. Some
authors argue that, in order to be consistent, health and wealth being
proxies for each other, require similar discount rates for both (Goodin,
1982, Keeler and Cretin, 1983, Parsonage and Neuburger, 1992).
3.3.1 Components of the Ramsey rate
Assuming the proxy argument, let us investigate the validity of the
famous Ramsey (1928) rate for health. Since higher income is gen-
erally a proxy for better health (an assumption which is however
debatable), economists have suggested transferring the Ramsey dis-
count rate to health which implies transferring the components of
the Ramsey rate to health measures, as well. His Graph from ”A
mathematical theory of saving” is reproduced below.
-
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SaveSpend Income
Utility
B = Bliss
Figure illustrating what proportion of income one should
save so as to indefinitely be attempting to approach bliss.
Note that the graph is an increasing one. (i.e. as Ramsey
assumed:” no misfortunes will occur to sweep away accumu-
lations at any point in the relevant future.”)
Figure 3.1: Graph from Ramsey’s ”Mathematical theory of saving”
We recall equation 3.5, r = + g", where the three components are
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, the rate of pure time preference, g, the growth rate of per-capita
consumption and ", the elasticity of marginal utility of consump-
tion. The pure rate of time preference simply reflects the degree
of impatience; everything else being equal (i.e. g = 0). It is the
marginal rate of substitution between present and future so that con-
sumption levels in both periods are equal. And the factor g" reflects
the growth rate of happiness from consumption, measured in terms
of utility.
The ’pure’ rate
The extent to which we should assign weight to future and present
generations in our moral decisions has been much explored since
Ramsey. Kavka (1978) provided an elegant argument towards the
rights of future generations. He condensed the major debates into
three main reasons for a positive pure rate of discount: the intertem-
poral location of the people, our knowledge of them and the contin-
gency of their lives.
The first reason has been traditionally dismissible by most authors
including Ramsey. Sidgwick (1874), for example, pointed out that
the maximization problem in utilitarianism yielding “the greatest
happiness of the greatest number” should not exclude distant gener-
ations. The second reason pertains mostly to the needs and desires of
future generations. The trivial argument that we don’t know the de-
mands of future generations has been intellectually much contended.
Kavka, for example, argued that enough food to eat, air to breathe,
space to move and fuel to run our machines are definitely known
prerequisites. And we are left with exploring the third reason.
Dasgupta and Heal (1979) argued that a non-zero probability of ex-
tinction of the human species might justify a positive pure discount
rate. A concise description of their derivation (Ponthiere, 2003)
goes as follows: Suppose a rational individual, belonging to an un-
known generation, faces the choice of an optimal infinite consump-
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tion stream for society. According to Laplace’s Principle of Insuf-
ficient Reason, the individual should assign equal probability to the
existence of each generation. However, considering an infinite time
horizon, “equi-probability” would make no sense and Dasgupta and
Heal introduced an immediate subjective probability that human life
on the Earth will cease beyond a time t. Assuming that this proba-
bility is decreasing in t, then priority given to existing people with
scarce resources is justified. Although this “probabilistic discount
rate” is different from the “temporal discount rate” (Parfit, 1984), the
decrease in t, which posits that the further generations are less likely
to exist than the closer ones, indicate some correlation to the tem-
poral rate which reflects the importance of future generations (Pon-
thiere, 2003).
In any case, nonexistence of future generation warrants a non-zero
positive pure discount rate for a society with scarce resources; i.e.
the pure rate is defensible depending on existence of future lives
and that rate is applied to utility from scarce resources. Hence, since
the theoretical foundation towards incorporation of the pure discount
rate is the non-existence of future lives but the concept of discount-
ing future lives implicitly assumes their existence, it would seem
that inclusion of the pure rate in the discount rate for health is circu-
lar reasoning. Consequently, discount rates prescribed for health in
most policies are over-estimated.
As a result, incorporation of the pure rate in discounting future lives
does not seem to have the theoretical foundations. Since discounting
future lives assumes their existence, in cases of the use of the social
discount rate for both life years and costs, it appears that rationality
dictates that one should omit the pure rate in the discounting of life
years. Moreover, as the QALY is a multiplicative combination of
life years and quality of life, such zero pure-rate might as well be
applicable to other health measures. In order to avoid circular rea-
soning, I am inclined towards differential discounting for health and
costs, omitting the pure rate for health.
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The growth rate of consumption
Moreover, economists are much more heroic in extending the as-
sumption of economic growth to QALYs or life years or other health
measures. As Ramsey himself stated, “The most serious factor ne-
glected is the possibility of future wars and earthquakes destroy-
ing our accumulations”. Although life expectancy, or life duration,
seems to be correlated with economic growth, the issue is that an
individual expects income to grow as she ages but unfortunately ex-
pects health, or health quality, to decline. Such assumptions chal-
lenge the foundations for an equal rate for health and wealth.
Nonetheless, assuming decisions for society, as a whole, one might
argue that growth in life expactancy should be enough of our con-
sideration. Even so, growth of life expectancy is generally mod-
erate compared to economic growth. The effects (estimated in log
terms) of a 1% increase in life expectancy on economic growth, re-
cently provided by Husain (2012), are: 4.2% in Barro (1996); 7.3%
in Barro and Lee (1996); 5.8% in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995);
6.3% in Bloom, Canning and Malaney (2000); 3.7% in Bloom and
Sachs (1998); 4% in Bloom and Williamson (1998); 3% in Gallup
and Sachs (2000); 7.2% in Hamoudi and Sachs (1999) and so on.
As a result, it would seem that the parameter, g, the growth rate of
life expactancy would be lower than that of economic growth.
Elasticity of marginal utility of consumption
Noting that Ramsey’s derivation considered only 2 time periods:
”now” and ”the future” where the future is seen as a single period
under consideration, the parameter, ", is also challenged. Valuation
of health effects is done in a bipartite way: namely the life years or
life duration and the value of a single life year. The utility model for
health is typically characterised by, firstly, linearity; i.e. the utility
attached to a life year gained is independent of the timing of occur-
rence and, secondly, by additivity; i.e. the utility of survival is ad-
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ditive over time (Miyamoto, 1999). Thus, the utility model for life
years should, not only be an isoelastic utility function, but should
have the same level of elasticity in order to admit the invariant Ram-
sey rate.
3.4 Discussion
Majority of bodies in today’s modern societies recommend a dis-
count rate for health that equals that of costs. However, a discount
rate for human lives equalling that of money does not seem to build
on a well reasoned theory. First, assumptions of marginal substitu-
tion between health and wealth do not seem valid due to the very
nature of a human life. Second, it appears that an ethically defensi-
ble discount rate for health necessarily ought to be lower than that
of costs. Impatience is a psychological trait that should be in our
economic theory; however it does not appear ethically correct to in-
clude such a rate in the discount rate of health.
Experts in the field are even puzzled by the appropriateness of im-
patience for the very evaluation of social welfare. Arrow (1999) and
Gollier (2012) provide a nice compilation of such citations. Sidg-
wick (1874): ”It seems ... clear that the time at which a man exists
cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of
view; and that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian
as much as those of his contemporaries”, Koopmans (1960): ”[I
have] an ethical preference for neutrality as between the welfare of
different generations”, Solow (1974): ”In solemn conclave assem-
bled, so to speak, we ought to act as if the social rate of pure time
preference were zero”, Harrod (1948): ”Pure time preference [is]
a polite expression for rapacity and the conquest of reason by pas-
sion”, to name a few. With regards to discounting human lives, when
the definitions of consumer and consumee overlap, one ought to re-
vise one’s assumptions.
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Moreover, given that growth rate in life expectancy is typically lower
than that of GDP and the utility function for health needs to be isoe-
lastic in order to yield a Ramsey rate, it would appear that, the com-
monly assumed discount rate for health, r =  + g", is not theo-
retically defensible. As a result, recalling that, in Ramsey’s deriva-
tion, the individual’s objective was to maximise his/her utility, then
with regards to human lives, we argue, that the government objec-
tive should be redesigned. Nonetheless, inclusion of the pure rate
is circular reasoning, growth in life expectancy is generally lower
than growth in GDP and the utility model assumed for a human life
ought to be isoelastic wherefore a theoretically defensible discount
rate for health should be lower than the SDR, implying differential
discounting.
51
Bibliography
ARROW KJ (1999) Discounting and Intergenerational Equity in
Portney and Weyant (eds), Resources for the Future
BARRO R(1996) Health and Economic Growth Paper Prepared for
the Pan American Health Organization, under Contract CSA-116-
96 of August 02 1996, PAHO, Washington DC
BARRO R AND LEE J (1994) Sources of Economic Growth
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 40, pg
1-46
BARRO R AND SALA-I-MARTIN X (1995). Economic Growth NY,
McGraw-Hill
BLOOM DE AND SACHS J (1998) Geography, Demography, and
Economic Growth in AfricaBrookings Papers on Economic Ac-
tivity, 2, pg 207-273
BLOOM D E AND WILLIAMSON J G (1998) Demographic Transi-
tions and Economic Miracles in Emerging AsiaWorld Bank Eco-
nomic Review, 12(3), pg 419-455
BLOOM DE, CANNING D AND MALANEY PN (2000) Demo-
graphic Change and Economic Growth in Asia Population and
Development Review, 26(supp.), pg 257-290
BOS JM, POSTMA MJ AND ANNEMANS L (2006) Discounting
health effects in pharmacoeconomic evaluations: current contro-
versies Pharmacoeconomics, 24, pg 1273-1274
52
BROUWER WBF AND VAN EXEL NJA (2004) Discounting in de-
cision making: the consistency argument revisited empirically J.
Health Policy, 67, pg 187-194
CAIRNS JA AND VAN DER POL MM (1997) Constant and decreas-
ing timing aversion for saving lives Soc. Sci. Med., 45(11), pg
1653-1659
CHAPMAN GB AND ELSTEIN AS (1995) Valuing the future: Tem-
poral discounting of health and money Med. Decis. Making, 15,
pg 373-86
DASGUPTA PS AND HEAL GM (1979): Economic Theory and Ex-
haustible Resources Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
FREDERICK S, LOEWENSTEIN G AND O’DONOGHUE T (2002)
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A critical review AEA,
40(2), pg 351-401
GALLUP J AND SACHS J (2000) The Economic Burden of Malaria
Working Paper No. 52, Center for International Development,
Harvard University, Cambridge
GOLLIER C (2012) Pricing The Planet’s Future: The Economics of
Discounting in an Uncertain World Princeton University Press
GOODIN R E (1982)Discounting discounting Journal of Public Pol-
icy, 2(1), pg 53-71
GRAVELLE H AND SMITH D (2001) Discounting for health ef-
fects in cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis Health Econ.,
10(7), pg 587-599
HAMOUDI A AND SACHS J (1999) Economic Consequences of
Health Status: A Review of the Evidence Working Paper No. 30,
Harvard Center for International Development, Cambridge
HARROD R (1948) Towards a Dynamic Economics NY, Macmillan
53
HUSAIN MJ (2012) Alternative Estimates of the Effect of the In-
crease of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth Economics Bul-
letin, AccessEcon, 32(4), pg 3025-3035
KAVKA G (1978): The Futurity Problem in Sikora and Barry (eds)
“Obligations to Future Generations”, pg 186-203
KEELER EB AND CRETIN S(1983) Discounting of Life-Saving
and Other Non-Monetary EffectsManagement Science, 29(3), pg
300-306
KOOPMANS TC (1960) Stationary ordinal utility and impatience
Econometrica, 28, pg 287-309
MIYAMOTO JM (1999) Quality adjusted life-years (QALY) utility
models under expected utility and rank dependent utility assump-
tions J. Math. Psychol, 43, pg 201-237
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CLINICAL EXCELLENCE (2008)
Guide to methods of technology appraisal London: NICE
PARFIT D (1984): “Reasons and Persons” Oxford, Oxford Univer-
sity Press
PARSONAGE M, NEUBURGER H (1992) Discounting and health
benefits Health Econ., 1(1), pg 71-76
PONTHIERE G (2003) http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/rppwpaper/0302.htm
RAMSEY FP (1928) A mathematical theory of saving The Economic
Journal, 38, pg 543-559
SAMUELSON P (1937) A Note on Measurement of Utility Review
of. Economic Studies, 4(2), pg 155-161
SIDGWICK H (1874): “TheMethods of Ethics”, London, MacMillan
SOLOW R (1974) The economics of resources or the resources of
economics American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
64(2), pg 1-14
54
UK TREASURY WEBSITE:www.hm-treasury.gov.uk
VISCUSI WK (1996) Discounting health effects for medical deci-
sions. In: Sloan FA, editor
55

Chapter 4
Questionnaire Development
1 The theoretical indefensibility of an equal rate offer presumptive
reasons to suspect that empirically observed rates for health out-
comes and for money might be different. It appeared natural to carry
out an empirical investigation into a differential rate for health com-
pared to the rate for monetary outcomes, such as income. In order
to do that, we sought to gather time preference data from a few hun-
dreds of individuals. However, although a word provides a means to
a meaning, variations in question formulation of a unique problem
have, historically, each proved to have their own right to exist. Jo-
hannesson and Johansson (1997), for example, found that implied
time preferences are contingent on the method of elicitation.
Due to divergent elicitation procedures, empirical investigations about
time preferences have rarely converged. Framing of the problem
is commonly known to yield differing resuls (Fischoff et al, 1980,
Tversky and Simonson, 1993). For example, the assumption that
e100 today is worth more than e100 in a year’s time imply that the
1Based on
PAROUTY MBY, KROOSHOF DGM, WESTRA TA, PECHLIVANOGLOU P AND
POSTMA MJ (2013) Reviewing and piloting methods for decreasing discount
rates Expert Reviews of Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes research, ac-
cepted
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future is valued less than the present. However, individuals generally
prefer increasing sequences than decreasing ones. Hence formula-
tion of questions regarding intertemporal choices differentiate time
preference studies from sequence studies.
Furthermore, individuals intertemporal preferences are also known
to diverge when temporal distances are formulated in terms of dates
or delays. Divergences in responses exist when questions are framed
in, for example, in five years time, or when you are five years older,
or five years from now. With that regards, we first piloted a sample
questionnaire among pharmacy students. The pilot sought to elicit
questions with considerations on:
1. Consistency of the questions for all types of outcome.
2. Clarity of the questions and how questions would be con-
ceived.
3. The possibility to elicit time preference separately for mone-
tary and health outcomes.
4. The possibility to elicit indifferences in consumption for dif-
ferent time points in the future.
5. The possibility to elicit optimistic or pessimistic views about
the future (with regards to both money and health)
4.1 Problem framing
Due to divergences in responses resulting from questionaire set-ups,
we seek a formulation that would, firstly, allow for comparability
between discounting money and discounting quality of life. As far
as possible, we shall aim to frame our querries in similar fashion
for both outcomes. Thus, differing discount rates for dissimilar out-
comes, would contrast more. Erecting questionnaires to elicit in-
tertemporal choices generally fall into three main categories; and
responses also typically fall into three groups (Frederick, 1999).
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4.1.1 Question formulation
Equity inquiry typically asks respondents about different outcomes
on a generation basis; i.e. for example, e100 gained by this gen-
eration compared to e100 gained by the next. Although we sug-
gest to consider intergenerational equity, comparability of our study
to the broad literature investigations implied an alternative formu-
lation. Sequence inquiry usually asks respondents to to consider
increasing or decreasing sequences of outcomes with time. The lat-
ter had, however, not much relevance for our purpose. Explicit in-
quiry, as the name suggests, explicitly mentions the gains and the
delays. We chose that formulation, as previous studies did before us.
For example, a question from Bobinac et al (2011) goes as follows;
You have to choose between:
1. Programme A, which yields 1000 healthy life years among
elderly this year. These elderly now have a life expectancy of
79 (with the programme this will be 80).
2. Programme B, which yields 1000 healthy life years among
elderly 5 years from now. These elderly now have a life ex-
pectancy of 79 (with the programme this will be 80).
In order to allow further comparability to the recent investigation on
life expectancy by Bobinac et al (2011), delays were also framed
akin; i.e. ”in 5 years time”, rather than, say, ”when you are 5 years
older”.
4.1.2 Response types
Responses, in time preference investigations, especially with regards
to time preferences of life years, typically are choices between two
interventions. A choice response is generally a preference for, say
program A that saves, say, 1000 human lives today compared to pro-
gram B saving 1000 human lives in 5 years. A matching response
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type, on the other hand, would state the number of human lives saved
so that program B feels as good as program A. A rating response
rates a program’s appeal compared to another; i.e. when individuals
are asked to rate the relative goodness of an outcome compared to
another (Svenson and Karlsson, 1989). We included questions that
resulted in both choice and rating type of responses. For exact word-
ing of the final questionnaire, please see this chapter’s appendix.
4.2 Rule rationality
Responses were verified based on rule rationality. The decision rule
of a rational individual has been, rather formally, expressed in litera-
ture as statements of consistency among preferences; i.e. axioms of
rationality. As a result, responses from the pharmacy students were
deemed good or bad if they met the criteria of Rational Choice The-
ory applied to intertemporal choices.
If we consider the consumption of a single good at two different
times, t = T and t = T 0 as two different goods, say qT and qT 0 , then
the Von Newman-Morgenstern rationality axioms (Von Neumann
andMorgenstern, 1953) prove to be quite useful for our purpose. We
shall assume that individuals are rational if and only if the following
statements hold true regarding their preferences for consumption of
qt; t = 1; 5; 10; 20 and 40. The first axiom, though trivial, states that
a decision must be made by the decision maker. Therefore we only
considered individuals who always expressed some kind of prefer-
ence for consumption at two different times, either less preferred,,
or more preferred, , or indifferent to, , to be deemed rational. As
the Von Newman-Morgenstern’s first axiom suggests:
Axiom 1. Completeness 8 T 6= T 0, qT  qT 0 or qT  qT 0 or qT 
qT
0
Secondly, an individual expressing a certain time preference towards
a commodity (quality of life or money) should be consistent among
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her preferences. That is, suppose an individual expresses more pref-
erences towards consumption in one years time than in, say, five
years time and the same individual expresses more preference for
consumption in five years’ time compared to ten years’ time, then
that individual is deemed rational if and only if she prefers con-
sumption now compared to consumption in ten years time. Thus, as
the second axiom states:
Axiom 2. Transitivity 8 T 6= T 0 6= T 00, If qT  qT 0 and qT 0  qT 00 ,
then qT  qT 00
Thirdly, consider an individual who is consistent among her intertem-
poral choices and who, for example, prefers consumption in one
years time compared to consumption in five years’ time and also
prefers consumption in five years’ time compared to consumption in
ten years’ time. Then, assuming preferences are continuous func-
tions, that individual should be able to settle for a gamble of con-
sumptions between most preferred(1 years time) and least preferred(10
years time) compared to a sure and certain consumption in 5 years
time. There exists an expected consumption with possible outcomes:
consumption in 1 years time and consumption in 10 years time, such
that the individual is indifferent between a sure and certain consump-
tion in 5 years time to the expected consumption. We therefore have:
Axiom 3. Continuity 8 T 6= T 0 6= T 00, If qT  qT 0  qT 00 , then 9 a
probability p 2 [0; 1] such that qT 0  pqT + (1  p)qT 00
Lastly, consider an individual who prefers consumption in 1 years
time compared to consumption in 10 years time. Then any other
consumption bundle that is equally added to the initial set of con-
sumptions should not alter the preferences. That is, if that individ-
ual initially prefers consumption in 1 years time to 10 years time
and is given the choice between the following two scenarios, A and
B, where A=consumption in 1 years time + consumption in 40 years
time and B=consumption in 10 years time + consumption in 40 years
time, then the rational individual should still prefer A to B because
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she initially preferred consumption in 1 year compared to 10 years.
The last axiom gives:
Axiom 4. Independence 8 T 6= T 0, If qT  qT 0 , then for any qT 00
and p 2 [0; 1], pqT + (1  p)qT 00  pqT 0 + (1  p)qT 00
4.3 Preliminary data analysis
Fifty students with an average age of 19 years, participated in the
survey. Out of these 50 participants, 2(4%) of the responses from
the monetary outcomes and 14(28%) from quality of life analysis vi-
olated at least one of the axioms of rationality. Preliminary discount
rates pooled, as commonly found in such empirical investigations,
indicated hyperbolic discount rates. As Nir (2004) stated, ”people
are impatient at present, but claim to become more patient in the fu-
ture”, which is typical of hyperbolic discounting. Although several
authors (Laibson, 1997, Rubinstein, 2003) argue that hyperbolic dis-
counting is time-inconsistent and therefore gives rise to many con-
ceptual problems, we do expect ourselves to wisen and becomemore
patient as we age. We therefore allowed hyperbolic time preferences
to be just as rational as exponential time preferences.
We, however, have a systematic methodology towards exclusion fac-
tors with regards to time preference investigations through the Von
Newman-Morgenstern rationality axioms (Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1953). It is typical of preference investigations in the lit-
erature that a non-zero percentage of respondents make irrational
choices. For example, Bobinac et al (2011) defined irrationality if
an answer their open-ended question did not align more than once
to the respondent’s prior programme choices. They found that 7.4%
were inconsistent. Given our small pilot sample size, the observed
proportion was deemed adequate in order to pursue our web-based
questionnaire for a more representative sample of the Dutch popula-
tion.
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4.a Appendix: Final questionnaire
Part A
This part of the questionnaire is on the individual’s personal situa-
tion, work and income.
A1. What is your gender?
(a) Female
(b) Male
A2. What is your highest level of education? (High school and
college levels are in Dutch terminology)
(a) Primary school
(b) High school: “huishoudschool, LTS, LEAO, VMBO, etc.”
(c) High school: “VMBO theoretische leerweg, MAVO, (M)ULO,
MMS, three years of HBS”
(d) High school: “HAVO, VWO, HBS”
(e) College: “MTS, MEAO, etc.”
(f) University/College: Degree: BA, BS, Ing.
(g) University/College: Degree MA, MS, Drs., Ir., PhD
(h) Etcetera
Part B
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Part B addresses the individuals quality of life.
The following questions are about your own state of health today.
Please indicate which statements most accurately describe your own
health today.
B1. Mobility
(a) I don’t have trouble walking
(b) I do have some trouble walking
(c) I am confined to bed
B2. Self-care
(a) I don’t have problems with washing or dressing myself
(b) I have some problems with washing or dressing myself
(c) I am unable to wash or dress myself
B3. Usual activities (e.g. work, study, household, family or leisure
activities)
(a) I have no problems with performing my usual activities
(b) I have some problems with performing my usual activities
(c) I am unable to perform my usual activities
64
B4. Pain and/or discomforts
(a) I don’t have any pain or discomforts
(b) I have moderate pain and/or discomforts
(c) I have extreme pain and/or discomforts
B5. Mood
(a) I am not anxious or depressed
(b) I am moderately anxious and/or depressed
(c) I am extremely anxious and/or depressed
B6. We would like you to rate the current state of your health, in
your opinion, on the scale below. The best state you can imagine is
marked 100 and the worst state you can imagine is marked 0.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Part C
This part investigates the time preferences, part C1 relates to time
preferences for money and C2 relates to that for quality of life.
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C1. Income
The following questions are on your preferences for receiving amounts
of money. What would you choose?
Suppose that the value of money does not change over time (so no
inflation occurs).
1. If you could choose between receiving e30.000.- one year from
now or receiving e30.000,- five years from now, what would you
choose?
(a) e30.000,- one year from now
(b) e30.000,- five years from now
(c) Both options are equal to me
(exact numericals in following questions are determined by the soft-
ware based on the previous answers)
2. And if you could choose between receivinge30.000.- in one year
from now or receivinge75.000,- in five years from now, what would
you choose?
(a) e30.000,- in one year from now
(b) e75.000,- in five years from now
(c) Both options are equal to me
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3. And if you could choose between receiving e30.000.- one year
from now or receiving e55.000,- five years from now, what would
you choose?
(a) e30.000,- one year from now
(b) e55.000,- five years from now
(c) Both options are equal to me
4. And if you could choose between receiving e30.000.- one year
from now or receiving e40.000,- five years from now, what would
you choose?
(a) e30.000,- one year from now
(b) e40.000,- five years from now
(c) Both options are equal to me
5. And if you could choose between receiving e30.000.- one year
from now or receiving e35.000,- five years from now, what would
you choose?
(a) e30.000,- one year from now
(b) e35.000,- five years from now
(c) Both options are equal to me
67
6. According to your answers, receiving an amount ofe30.000,- one
year from now has an equal value to you as receiving an amount of
somewhere between e35.000,- and e40.000,- five years from now.
(Range is been determined by the software, range shown is example)
We would like you to indicate on the scale below, the exact amount
between e35.000,- and e40.000,-which, if received five years from
now, would have the exact same value to you as receiving e30,000,-
one year from now.
e 35000 e 40000
C2. Health
The following questions are on health and your preference. We
would like you to choose from three options and mark which op-
tion you prefer.
First, we would like you to pay attention to the following states of
health, just to get an idea of how it works. You don’t have to choose
yet.
1. Decreasing mobility due to walking problems gives a 15 points
loss.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2. Severe anxiety/depression gives a 32 points loss.
68
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
3. Severe pain and at the same time being unable to perform usual
activities gives a 56 points loss.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
On question B6, you indicated your own health with . . . points (score
is shown)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Suppose, that due to a disease you lost 30 points of your health (so
30 points compared to the estimation you gave at B6; again score is
shown)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Attention: the loss of health occurs all of a sudden, you don’t know
beforehand when it will occur.
Assume, this lower health rate would last for a year, after that your
health will return back to its normal state.
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1. Suppose this temporal loss of health would occur one year, or five
years from now. What would you prefer?
(a) A loss of 30 points one year from now
(b) A loss of 30 points five years from now
(c) Both options are equal to me.
(exact numericals in following questions are determined by the soft-
ware based on the previous answers)
2. Suppose the decrease in health would be larger when it occurs
later, so smaller when it occurs earlier. What would your choice be
in that case?
(a) A loss of 25 points one year from now
(b) A loss of 30 points five years from now
(c) Both options are equal to me.
3. Suppose the decrease in health would be larger when it occurs
later, so smaller when it occurs earlier. What would your choice be
in that case?
(a) A loss of 15 points one year from now
(b) A loss of 30 points five years from now
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(c) Both options are equal to me.
4. According to your answers, losing 30 points five years from now
has an equal value to you as losing an amount of points of some-
where between 15 and 25 points in one year from now.
(Range is determined by the computer; range shown is example)
We would like you to indicate on the scale below, the exact num-
ber of points between 15 and 25, which, if lost one year from now,
would have the exact same value to you as losing 30 points five years
from now.
15 pts 25 pts
Part D
Part D contains questions about future expectations in general.
D1. Question on living in good health
At the moment people in the Netherlands live on average 65 years in
good health conditions. Please fill in the number of years you expect
people in the Netherlands to live in good health in 5, 10, 20 and 40
years.
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Number of years in good
health now
65 years
Number of years in good
health in 5 years
. . . . . .
Number of years in good
health in 10 years
. . . . . .
Number of years in good
health in 20 years
. . . . . .
Number of years in good
health in 40 years
. . . . . .
D2. Question on life expectancy
At the moment people in the Netherlands, on average, reach the age
of 79 years old. Please fill in the average age, you expect people in
the Netherlands will reach 5, 10, 20 and 40 years from now.
Life expectancy now 79 years
Life expectancy in 5
years
... . . ..
Life expectancy in 10
years
. . . . . .
Life expectancy in 20
years
. . . . . .
Life expectancy in 40
years
. . . . . .
D3. Question on income
At the moment the average income in the Netherlands is e 32.500,-
per year. Please fill in the average income you expect to be earned
in the Netherlands 5, 10, 20 and 40 years from now.
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Average annual income
now
e 32.500
Average annual income
in 5 years
... . . ..
Average annual income
in 10 years
. . . . . .
Average annual income
in 20 years
. . . . . .
Average annual income
in 40 years
. . . . . .
Thank you kindly for your cooperation
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Chapter 5
Empirical Evidence
1 Draft questionnaires, having been piloted among a convenience
sample of 1st year pharmacy students (Parouty et al, 2013), the pi-
lot strengthened the initial idea on the appropriateness and validity
of the question formulations and enabled us to pinpoint questions in
any detail considered relevant. We are, thus, in a suitable position
to assess whether rates of time preference for health outcomes are
lower than those of money. Time preference investigations in health
have, thus far, mostly involved life years gained and life saved. The
Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) which is recommended by sev-
eral bodies is however a multiplicative measure of life duration and
quality of life. In particular, for the current purpose, we choose to
find rates of time preference for money and for quality of life for the
health part.
Apart from consistently comparing preferences for quality of life
with those for money, we will also investigate how some popula-
tion characteristics reflect in time preferences for both money and
quality of life. More specifically, with this chapter, we aim to con-
tribute to three discussions concerning discounting: (i) we want to
1Based on
PAROUTY MBY, KROOSHOF DGM AND POSTMA MJ (2013) On some endoge-
nous determinants of time preferences for money and quality of life submitted
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provide further empirical evidence on the rationale for differential
discounting, (ii) we want to validly assess the impact of certain pop-
ulation characteristics on time preferences and (iii) we aim to em-
pirically elicit population time preferences for money. Sampling
was done using a representative sample of the Dutch population
and was managed by Samplingsurvey International (Rotterdam NL,
www.surveysamplinginternational.com), a service company special-
ized and experienced in sampling. In particular, a sample of 847
individuals was questionnaired in 2011 and formed the basis of our
analysis.
We sought to assess how individuals would compare gains of money
with a year’s delay from now to gains of money with delays of 5, 10,
20 and 40 years from now and gains in quality of life with a year’s
delay from now to gains in quality of life with the four other delays.
We did not impose any exclusion criteria on the individuals since we
wish to investigate the effect of certain population characteristics on
time preferences and seek to gather maximum information. It is
also important to note that we did not provide an immediate gain as
part of any choices because we wished for the Neocortex and the
Thalamus, in the individual’s mind, to be equally activated while
responding.
5.1 Methods
The respondents were asked to compare a gain of e30,0000 one
year from now, to a sum of money to which they would be indiffer-
ent to after the four different delays. With regards to quality of life,
individuals were asked to imagine that 30% of their quality of life
will be removed in one year, with 0% being the worst imaginable
health state and 100% being the best imaginable health state. Com-
pared to that utility loss in one year, individuals were asked to state
the percentage to which they would be indifferent to after the dif-
ferent future delays. In order to obtain the discount rates for quality
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of life, we assumed a perfect negative correlation between loss of
health quality and gain in health quality; although it might be that
our assumption needs further investigation.
Respondents were categorized into different mutually exclusive sub-
groups. Our first partitioning criterion was gender since males and
females were suspected to have differing time preferences. Further,
since individuals with poor health states might place higher impor-
tance to current health, etcetera, we also included questions on qual-
ity of life using EuroQol (EQ-5D) and visual analogue scale (VAS)
to serve as a further partition basis (see Appendix). Partitioning was
performed on the answers to EQ-5D and subsequent sorting was
done on VAS if EQ5D equalled. Responses for individuals with
relatively good health were compared to individuals with relatively
poor health. These were termed high health status and low health
status respectively.
A further partition of the sample involved education level. Literature
has a huge repository regarding the diverging time preferences be-
tween relatively educated individuals and relatively uneducated in-
dividuals. Empirical evidences suggest that educated individuals are
more patient than uneducated individuals (Oreopoulos, 2011). If the
hypothesis that schooling increases patience is true, then we expect
lower time preferences for the more educated individuals. We par-
titioned our sample into two groups; individuals who had Middel-
baar beroepsonderwijs (MTS, MEAO, etc..), individuals with Hoger
beroepsonderijs and individuals with university education were clas-
sified in ”higher education”. The remaining was considered to have
”lower education”.
Next, we considered age which is commonly known as being a
strong determinant for varying degrees of time preferences. The
former has long been argued to correlate with optimistic/pessimistic
views about the future). For example, Steinberg et al (2009) pro-
vided evidences that individuals younger than 16 years old express
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higher preferences to accept a smaller reward sooner than a larger
reward that is delayed. Younger people generally tend to have a rel-
atively more optimistic view of their future. Furthermore, parental
longevity has also been found to correlate to offspring’s optimism (Rius-
Ottenheim et al, 2012). It is generally argued that increased opti-
mism is associated with higher discount rates (Berndsen and van
der Plight, 2001). In our inferences, direct measurement of beliefs
was carried out. Responses were classified into two mutually ex-
clusive sets; namely ”optimistic” and ”pessimistic” about the fu-
ture. We asked respondents about their general feelings regarding
the future, in particular whether one is basically positively or neg-
atively inclined in this respect (optimistic or pessimistic) with re-
gards to quality of life, life expectancy and income (See part D in
Appendix). Individuals having all responses, at delays of 20 years,
that were lower than the number stated as being the case right now,
were deemed pessimistic. The remaining was classified as opti-
mistic. Discount rates were pooled at each individual time point
by the formula:
Qt2 = Qt1(1 + rQ)
t2 t1
with:
rQ: annual discount rate for outcome Q
Qt1: amount t1 years from now
Qt2: amount t2 years from now
Notably, Q’s can reflect money or quality of life, corresponding with
the questionnaires. From the individual discount rates, the means
were calculated and were plotted against the time of delay. Since this
chapter aims to investigate the differences in time preferences rather
than expressing exact numericals, linear regression, as previously
done by Cropper et al (1992), was fitted to each sub-category. Linear
regression provides a useful way of investigating the differences,
especially, since the slopes for the subgroups are roughly expected
to be similar to that of the overall sample. As a result, the intercepts
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should be numerical markers of the differences in time preferences
with respect to differing sub-groups.
5.2 Results
Table 5.1 below represents the sample properties for the 847 indu-
viduals. As obviously not all questions were answered consistently
by all eligible individuals, denominators for sub-analyses – for ex-
ample, on optimistic/pessimistic future perspectives – may differ.
Table 5.1: Partitioning of overall sample set in mutually exclusive
subsets
Respondent Characteristics N=847 (100%)
Gender
Female 422 (50%)
Male 425 (50%)
Health state
Higher health status 424 (50%))
Lower health status 423 (50%)
Optimistic on
3 questions 377 (45%)
2 questions 165 (19%)
1 question 146 (17%)
0 question 159 (19%)
Education
Higher education 491 (58%)
Lower education 356 (42%)
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Figure 5.1 shows the overall discount rates, suggesting declining dis-
count rates over increasing time of delay, in contrast to a constant
rate. The annual discount rate for money consistently lies above the
annual discount rate of quality of life, with that for money being at
least twice that for health over the whole spectrum. Notably, this
factor increases to at least eight times with increasing time of delay.
-
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
Figure 5.1: Annual discount rate for money() and health() plotted
against time of delay.
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Figure 5.2 shows results for men and women on money, again, indi-
cating a decline over increasing time of delay. The annual discount
rate of female respondents lays approximately 13% above the an-
nual discount rate of male respondents for sooner delays, decreasing
to about 7% with increasing delays.
-
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Figure 5.2: Annual discount rate for money plotted against time of
delay. Female(/) respondents are compared to male() respondents.
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Figure 5.3 illustrates –for money– the typical profile for optimistic
versus pessimistic respondents. In particular, the tendency shows
that optimistic individuals tend to elicit relatively higher discount
rates, although the profiles seem to regress to a mean at around a
delay of five years from the present. This is in line with other results,
where ad extremum individuals with a very pessimistic view on the
future could even start exhibiting negative discount rates. This was
however not seen in our data.
-
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Figure 5.3: Annual discount rate for money plotted against time of
delay. Respondents who are optimistic () are compared to pes-
simistic (?) respondents.
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Figure 5.4 illustrates the results after sorting on health status; i.e.
on EQ5D and VAS. The figure shows that individuals in the lower
50%-percentile of EQ5D/VAS begin to discount at approximately
similar rates to those in the upper percentile and discount up to 102
% higher than those in the upper percentile within the furthest delay.
-
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Figure 5.4: Annual discount rate for health plotted against time of
delay. Respondents belonging to the upper 50% regarding health
status (.) are compared to those belonging to the lower 50% regard-
ing health status ().
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Table 5.2: Linear regression fits on the discount rate for money (r =
 + t) and 95% confidence intervals, C.I.’s
Characteristic  (95% C.I.)  (95% C.I.)
Overall 0.132 (0.098, 0.167) -0.002 (-0.003, -0.000)
Male 0.127 (0.091, 0.163) -0.002 (-0.003, -0.000)
Female 0.138 (0.104, 0.172) -0.002 (-0.003, -0.000)
Higher health status 0.126 (0.095, 0.157) -0.002 (-0.003, -0.000)
Lower health status 0.139 (0.102, 0.177) -0.002 (-0.004, -0.000)
Optimistic 0.133 (0.101, 0.165) -0.002 (-0.003, -0.000)
Pessimistic 0.130 (0.087, 0.173) -0.002 (-0.004, -0.000)
Higher Education 0.123 (0.098, 0.148) -0.002 (-0.003, -0.000)
Lower Education 0.146 (0.094, 0.168) -0.002 (-0.005,-0.000)
The decline in the discount rate for money was approximately the
same in all cases. As such, the regression analysis confirmed what
was already suspected; males, individuals with higher quality of life,
pessimistic individuals and individuals with relatively higher educa-
tion have a lower discount rate than their counterparts; as observed
from the intercept, . Next, the regressions for the rate of time pref-
erence for quality of life are shown in the table below.
Table 5.3: Linear regression fits on the discount rate for quality of
life (r =  + t) and 95% confidence intervals, C.I.’s
Characteristic  (95% C.I.)  (95% C.I.)
Overall 0.044 (0.010, 0.079) -0.001 (-0.003, 0.001)
Male 0.042 (0.008, 0.076) -0.001 (-0.002, 0.001)
Female 0.048 (0.011, 0.085) -0.001 (-0.003, 0.001)
Higher health status 0.044 (0.007, 0.082) -0.001 (-0.003, 0.001)
Lower health status 0.045 (0.013, 0.078) -0.001 (-0.002, 0.000)
Optimistic 0.052 (0.012, 0.093) -0.001 (-0.003, 0.001)
Pessimistic 0.014 (-0.007, 0.034) 0.000 (-0.001, 0.001)
Higher Education 0.048 (0.011, 0.085) -0.001 (-0.003, 0.000)
Lower education 0.041 (0.008, 0.073) -0.001 (-0.002, 0.001)
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Again, the same trends were observed for quality of life as for money.
Further, the discount rates for both money and health decrease over
increasing time of delay as indicated by the correlation coefficient of
almost negative one, t;rM =  0:964 and t;rQ =  0:896; where ’s
denote the sample correlation coefficients for money and for quality
of life, respectively. Linear regressions for money and health versus
delay indicated that the discount rate function for money is higher
than that of health for all delays. Linear regressions on individuals
with different health statuses also indicated higher health status in-
dividuals correspond to lower discount rates. Similar discount rate
functions were estimated for subgroups on gender and views about
the future. Optimistic individuals and females elicit higher discount
rates.
While observations were all in line with literature with regards to
discounting money, relatively more educated individuals had a higher
time preference for quality of life in contrast to a lower time pref-
erence for money when compared to relatively less educated indi-
viduals. It is often argued that educated individuals are more pa-
tient, which explains the lower time preference for money. However,
as Becker and Mulligan (1997) argue, schooling trains the imagina-
tion of future rewards and better foresight. As such, in their own
words, “educated people should be more productive at reducing the
remoteness of future pleasures”. Thus, the ubiquitous expectation of
income to increase as we age but that of quality of life to decrease
provides a plausible explanation. In Fischer’s words, it appears that
relatively higher educated individuals discount future quality of life
at a high rate due to “the thought that provision for the present is
necessary both for the present itself and for the future as well” (Fis-
cher, 1930).
Differences in discount rates related to grouping of our sample with
respect to gender, health status and general attitude (pessimistic/optimistic)
were sometimes consistent across time, attributes and types of anal-
ysis. Despite being interesting per se, such differences might not
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trigger any impacts on recommendations on discounting as, gener-
ally, for that purpose, the societal perspective is dominant. Notably,
within society the heterogeneity over gender, attitudes and health
status is implicit and therefore the recommended societal perspec-
tive should entangle the preferences of these subgroups in an inte-
grated manner, rather than by the constituting elements of society.
5.3 Discussion
This chapter obviously has some limitations; the most important
of which remains inferring broader societal perspective in line with
cost-effectiveness analyses from an empirical research on discount-
ing. We have designed the questions as specifically and objectively
as possible and refrained from any potential hints for directions of
answers, however always seeking the alignment with broader per-
spectives takes in health-economic analyses from societal perspec-
tive ad ultimo. Further work remains to be done here; we however
remark that the qualitative differences and trends observed in our
study should be the focal point rather than the exact quantitative re-
sults.
Nonetheless, summarizing our findings:
1. The discount rate for money is consistently higher than that of
health, for all horizons
2. The discount rate decreases over increasing time of delay
3. The rate of decline of the discount rate decreases over increas-
ing time of delay
4. A lower health status corresponds with a higher discount rate
5. Females elicit higher discount rates compared to males
6. Optimistic individuals elicit higher discount rates than pes-
simistic individuals
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7. Relatively more educated individuals have lower time prefer-
ences for money but higher time preferences for health com-
pared to relatively uneducated individuals.
It is well substantiated in literature that empirically found discount
rates are relatively higher than numericals featuring in various (inter-
)national guidelines for pharmacoeconomic or health economic pur-
poses (ISPOR website, 2012). Having that in mind, we rather draw
inferences from the relative results on discount rates of, for example,
health versus money and males versus females, optimistic versus
pessimistic and on decreasing trends in time rather than focusing on
exact levels of discounting. Decreasing trends in the discount rates
as found here are in line with suggestions made in the literature and
some guidelines (Bazelon, 2002, Beutels et al, 2008, UK Treasury,
2013, WHO Guidelines, 2012). Yet, in application, we do not of-
ten notice decreasing discount rates being used. However one might
expect the uptake of decreasing rates; in particular in the area of
long-term prevention such as vaccination programs. The method-
ology has been investigated in this specific area, taking the case of
HPV vaccination, for example, in chapter 2.
Our results, however, support differential discounting, particularly,
given our sample was representative of the Dutch population. The
discussion on differential discounting has a history dating back at
least 2 decennia (Parsonage and Neuberger, 1992). Countries for
which the discussion has actually impacted on the discount rates in
the guidelines are the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium so far. The
ongoing discussion in the UK is reflected in a recent UK-initiative (NICE
Report, 2012) that recommends NICE to allow differential discount-
ing of costs and health effects if interventions concern investment
upfront and benefits accruing over future delays; i.e. for interven-
tions in children, prevention and public health (HPV-vaccination
would indeed fit in all categories). Furthermore, the report refers
again to the UK Treasury (2013) that already suggested decreasing
discounting with increasing delays, a while ago. Both recommenda-
89
tions are in line with our (and others’) empirical findings.
However, with respect to our argument in chapter 3, the recent NICE
Report (2012) summarizes that societal time preference can be con-
sidered to reflect pure time preference, uncertainty and growth (in
the economy in particular). The latter reduces the marginal utility
of additional units. Uncertainty is implicit in all aspects of any de-
cision, both money and health related. For example, uncertainty in
the economic analysis of the HPV-vaccines may relate to the fact
that prevention of cervical cancers pertain to periods decennia af-
ter actual vaccination; i.e. it is uncertain whether in the meantime
an effective pharmacotherapy for this cancer might be developed or
not. This uncertainty clearly impacts on economic aspects (savings
on cancer costs) and health aspects (death and quality losses due to
cancer).
A discount rate of 1.5% might nonetheless adequately reflect this
part of time preference for a broad range of developed economies,
including the UK and the Netherlands. Economic growth gives
an additional motivation for an overall higher time preference for
money, often chosen in the range 3-5% (Gold et al, 1996, Gravelle
and Smith, 2001, ISPOR website, 2012, Klok et al, 2005, NICE Re-
port, 2012). Relatively more modest growth in health (for example,
in life expectancy as we list in chapter 3) has motivated arguments
about a lower discount rate for health, challenging the invariance as-
sumption in the discounted utility(DU) model. Our empirical anal-
ysis, however, reinforces the argument for differential discounting.
Perhaps, when considering health outcomes, individuals do not ex-
hibit pure impatience. In any case, based on a representative sample
of the Dutch population, a lower rate for health is strongly moti-
vated.
90
Bibliography
BAZELON B (2002) Discounting in the long term Loyala of Los
Angeles Law Review, 35, pg 277
BECKER GS AND MULLIGAN CB (1997) The Endogenous De-
termination of Time Preference Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112, pg 729-58
BERNDSEN M AND VAN DER PLIGT J (2001) Time is on my side:
Optimism in intertemporal choice Acta Psychologica, 108, pg
173-186
BEUTELS P, SCUFFHAM PA AND MACINTYRE CR (2008) Fund-
ing of drugs: do vaccines warrant a different approach? Lancet
Infect. Dis., 8, pg 727-733
BROUWER WBF, NIESSEN LW, POSTMA MJ AND RUTTEN FFH
(2005) Need for differential discounting of costs and health effects
in cost-effectiveness analyses BMJ, 331, pg 446-448
CLAXTON K, SCULPHER M, CULYER A, MCCABE C, BRIGGS A,
AKEHURST R, BUXTON M AND BRAZIER J (2006) Discounting
and cost-effectiveness in NICE-stepping back to sort out a confu-
sion Health Economics, 15, pg 1-4
CROPPER ML, AYDEDE SK AND PORTNEY PR (1992) Rates of
Time Preference for Saving Lives The American Economic Re-
view, 82, pg 469-472
91
CVZ WEBSITE:www.cvz.nl
FISCHER I (1930) The theory of interest rate NY, Macmillan
GOLD MR, SIEGEL JE, RUSSELL LB AND WEINSTEIN MC
(1996) Cost-effectiveness in Health and Medicine ISBN 978-0-
19-510824-8
GRAVELLE H AND SMITH D (2001) Discounting for health effects
in cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis Health Economics,
10, pg 587-599
ISPOR WEBSITEwww.ispor.org
KCE WEBSITE:www.kce.fgov.be
KLOK RM , BROUWER WB, ANNEMANS LJ, BOS JM AND
POSTMA MJ (2005) Towards a healthier discount procedure Ex-
pert Reviews in Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research, 5,
pg 59-63
OREOPOULOS P AND SALVANES GK (2011) Priceless: The Non-
pecuniary Benefits of Schooling Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 25, pg 159-84
NICE REPORT WEBSITE:
http://www.nice.org.uk/getinvolved/currentniceconsultations/CCReport2012
forComment
PAROUTY ET AL (2013) Expert review in Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research accepted
PARSONAGE M AND NEUBURGER H (1992) Discounting and
health benefits Health Econ., 1, pg 71-6
RIUS-OTTENHEIM N, KROMHOUT D, CRAEN AJM, GELEIJNSE
JM, MAST VAN DER RC, ZITMAN FG, WESTENDORP RG,
92
SLAGBOOM E AND GILTAY EJ(2012) Parental longevity cor-
relates with offspring’s optimism in two cohorts of community-
dwelling older subjects Age / the official journal of the American
Aging Association, 34, pg 461-468 References
STEINBERG L, O’BRIEN L, CAUFFMAN E et al (2009) Age dif-
ference in future orientation and delay discounting Child Dev.,
80(1), pg 28-44
UK TREASURY WEBSITE:www.hm-treasury.gov.uk
WHO guidelines by Beutels and Damian Walker report
WESTRA TA, PAROUTY MBY, BROUWER WB, BEUTELS PH,
ROGOZA RM, ROZENBAUM MH, DAEMEN T, WILSCHUT JC,
BOERSMA C AND POSTMA MJ. (2012) On discounting health
gains from Human Papilloma Virus Vaccination Value in Health,
15, pg 562-567
93

Part II
A Framework for Differential
Discounting
95

Chapter 6
Differential Discounting
1 Empirical investigations, provided in the previous chapter, suggest
that the discount rates of health outcomes are consistently lower
than those of money, especially given that chapter 4 ensured that
question formulations for both were, as far as possible, similar. Fur-
thermore, chapter 3 argues that the use of a single rate is not the-
oretically defensible with regards to discounting health. None of
these are as important as the implications provided in chapter 2. The
cost-effectiveness of vaccination for human papilloma virus (HPV),
where savings on cancer costs, averted mortality and QALY gains
are all decennia after teenage HPV-vaccination programs, clearly
indicates that discounting at various rates ranging up to 4% may re-
duce savings and QALYs up to 5-fold (Brisson et al, 2007, Westra
et al, 2012). Grossly this 5-fold reduction would be mirrored by a
5-fold increase in the cost-effectiveness ratio of HPV-vaccination if
the discounted ratio would be compared with the undiscounted ratio.
1Based on
POSTMA MJ, PAROUTY MBY AND WESTRA TA (2013) Accumulating evidence
for the case of differential discounting Expert Rev. Clin. Pharmacol. 6(1),
pg 1-3
WESTRA TA, PAROUTY MBY, WILSCHUT JC, BOERSMA C AND POSTMA MJ
(2011) Re:Practical Implications of Differential Discounting of Costs and
Health Effects in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Value in Health 14, pg 1173-
1175
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The lack of a theoretical underpinning in the attempts to bring out-
comes in harmony with ethics begs the question about whether gov-
ernment officials should reflect our instincts in policies regarding
discounting of health, even when these are irrational. An ethically
defensible guideline should, however, also be theoretically defen-
sible. Arguably, policies should incorporate a democratic public
agent’s time preference in society, reflecting differences in prefer-
ences due to timing of outcomes, be them related to monetary out-
comes (costs and savings), health (life years and quality of life) or
other consumption goods. With that regards, several bodies, includ-
ing NICE (2008), prescribe a single rate for both costs and out-
comes. The rationale for equal discounting of health gains dates
back to the postponement paradox of Keeler and Cretin (1983).
They argued that discounting costs and effects at different rates would
result in inconsistencies in decision making as it would then matter
whether one would discount future benefits to compare them with
current costs, or compound forward in time current costs to compare
them with future benefits. The paradox of Keeler and Cretin (1983)
implies that it would always be more cost-effective to wait until im-
plementation of an intervention. The inappropriateness of this wait-
ing strategy stems from a general economic paradox which Koop-
mans (1967) called: ”the paradox of the indefinitely postponed splurge”.
A major economic assumption for this paradox is that the future re-
turn to capital is positive ( as we have seen in Ramsey’s derivation
in chapter 3), and utility is increasing in consumption. Thus, not
discounting benefits at the social discount rate would cause distant
generations to be, in the words of Nozick (1974), utility monsters,
due to excessive sacrifice of the current generation (Arrow, 1983,
Chakravarty, 1962, Solow, 1974).
When Keeler and Cretin (1983) ”reinvented this paradox to prove
that future health benefits must be discounted at the same rate as
costs” (Frederick, 1999), the inconsistencies of differential discount-
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ing were deemed inappropriate. However, years after Keeler and
Cretin (1983) transferred this paradox to health outcomes, Gravelle
and Smith (2001) contended their proof with a simple argument that
the postponement paradox has a fundamental assumption that the
monetary value of health is constant into the indefinite future. While
constancy of the monetary value of health in time is a possibility, it
was not deemed to be a well-founded assumption. The last decade
has thus seen adoption of differential rates in a few guidelines.
Primarily based on the work of Gravelle and Smith (2001), the UK
was prominent to be the first country to adopt differential discount-
ing around the turn of the century with discount rates of 6% for
money and 1.5% for health. However, in 2004, the UK changed
back to equal discounting after reiterating the landmark paper by
Keeler and Cretin. During that same time, Klok et al (2005) adapted
the Gravelle and Smith model to the Netherlands, estimating a 4%
discount rate for money and 1.5% for health that subsequently led
to a diversion from equal to differential discounting in the Dutch
guidelines. The opposite switches in the UK and the Netherlands
led to an interesting polemic between authors involved in NICE and
in the Dutch guidelines (Brouwer et al, 2005, Claxton et al, 2006).
Belgium followed the Dutch approach just a few years later‘ (KCE
, 2013). Notably, the two “low countries” are the only ones in the
world prescribing differential discounting for a human life given it’s
specificities (CvZ , 2013, KCE , 2013).
6.1 Discounting dynamism
The non-constancy of the growing value of health through time calls
attention to multifarious regards to cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA).
Since in an equilibrium state, augmentation somewhere should mir-
ror in a reduction some other where, the complex considerations en-
tailing differential discounting have refrained economists from delv-
ing beyond the statement that ”the monetary value of health might
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grow over time”. Although health has often been assumed to have
a one-to-one relationship with wealth, it seems that a situation of
abundance of wealth need not necessarily imply abundance of health
and vice versa; though the converse is even more true.
While economists might argue that the industrial sector is associ-
ated with improving both wealth and health, an idea that has been
recently explored by Pritchett and Summers (1996) in their paper
entitled “Wealthier is healthier”, historians such as Szreter (2004)
noted that the paradox is that industrialization itself, like all forms
of economic growth, exerts intrinsically negative population health
effects among the communities that are most directly involved in the
transformations which it entails. He also noted that this proposition
grows even stronger when it is realized that in majority of the indus-
trialization cases of todays successful developed economies, their
historical demographic trends exhibit the same pattern of a negative
inflection in health trends during the decades in which industrializa-
tion mostly affected their populations.
When we regard the timely demand-supply of some measure of
health, it seems that the correlation between health effects and in-
come through time is not strictly one. Rather, the market for health
states is a dynamic one. For example, with changes in preferences
for health states, measures such as the EuroQol-5D for a societal val-
uation or the EQ VAS for an individual valuation, are also affected.
We have already seen, in the previous chapter, that individuals with
a higher health state discount at a different rate than those with a
relatively lower health state. Thus, health state measures, in turn, al-
ter our utility and welfare valuations for health. And consequently,
this would impact on a different rate of time preference for health.
And the new discount rate, in turn, changes the list of cost-effective
interventions and the whole cycle begins over again.
Different sectors of the economy impact on our health and health
states preferences and these preferences, in turn, impact on the dis-
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count factor. Following this line of thought, it seems that the whole
economic system has to be taken into account when attempting to
value the future. Our former concept of a linear sequence of events
from cause to effect seems to forsake the interlinkage that exists
among different sectors of the economy and the models used this far
have been those of mere equations which traditionally involve two
quantities. Simply transferring discounting principles from money
to health, not only lacks the theoratical foundations, but also has dra-
matic consequences on the rights of future generations.
As a result, since there seems to be, firstly, an ethical need, secondly,
a theoretical motivation, and thirdly, empirical evidences for a dif-
ferential rate for health, it would appear that there is need to review
our theoretical framework regarding discounting in general. General
health economic literature assumes an economy composed of health
and income only; and maximization problems, whether concerning
the discounted health outcomes or the present consumption value of
health, are often subject to an exogenous budget constraint (Clax-
ton et al, 2011). I, however, argue that growth of health effects
depends, not only on wealth, but also, on growth of other sectors
(commodities) of the economy which are directly or indirectly re-
lated to health.
6.2 Dynamics denotation
While non-constancy of a monetary or some other measurable value
of health through time suggests extending the invariant discount rate
assumption to commodity-specific and time-specific ones, our im-
perfect forsight (and inability to (for-)see all the levers and pulleys
behind the stage) suggests the use of measure theoretic probability.
The impact of a lack of such unification between imperfect forsight
and a potentially growing value of health has recently gained our at-
tention with regards to multi-cohort CEA specifications.
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O’Mahony et al (2011) show that the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio (ICER) for HPV vaccination decreases if differential discount-
ing is applied with an increasing number of annual vaccinated co-
horts analyzed; that is, going from single cohort, through 10 and 20,
to 30 cohorts. In their wordings, they label the choice of how many
cohorts to include in the model as arbitrary variation in study speci-
fication and subsequently the related outcomes as arbitrary variation
in results. With differential discounting, the ICER decreases in their
hypothetical calculations from almost e30,000, through e27,000
(10 cohorts) and e24,000 (20 cohorts), to e22,000 per quality- ad-
justed life-year if 30 cohorts are analyzed.
We, however, argue that the choice of the number of generations to
include in the model is far from arbitrary, as is the corresponding
outcome. In particular, the number of cohorts included in the model
should directly reflect the envisioned time horizon for the implemen-
tation of the vaccination. As generally a vaccination program is not
foreseen for 1 year only, inclusion of multicohorts is an adequate
approach. The exact number of cohorts is to be discussed; however,
rather than being arbitrary it should reflect a valid idea on the mini-
mum period for the vaccination program to be in place. That many
researchers do choose a single-cohort model for analysis can easily
be motivated by the fact that
1. a model as least complex as possible should always be strived
for.
2. this would always represent a conservative approach, given
the downward slope of the ICER as a function of the number
of cohorts included.
If specification of the time horizon for intervention upfront is not
desired or possible in a multicohort model, the following reason-
ing might be considered. Notably, the authors consistently discount
costs and effects to the first year; that is, the year in which the first
cohort is vaccinated. It might, however, be argued that the benefits
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for a particular cohort should be discounted to the moment the in-
tervention took place in this specific cohort, which would result in
identical ICERs for each subsequent cohort.
Correspondingly and consistently based on the theoretical basis of
differential discounting, it might be argued that the willingness- to-
pay threshold increases for subsequent cohorts. In particular, be-
cause of the increasing value of health over time, the willingness-
to-pay threshold increases, rendering the constant ICERs more cost-
effective year by year. We argue that in judging the ICERs of subse-
quent cohorts one should take this change in the willingness-to-pay
threshold into account. So, potentially, it is possible that because
of the increasing value of health, an intervention might not be cost-
effective for the current cohort, while the intervention will become
cost-effective for future cohorts. While this is fully in line with the
rationale behind differential discounting, it appears that probabilis-
tic statements about future ought to be feasible in order to admit
differential rates with caution.
6.3 Denouement
Hence, proxies for health that policy makers should consider ought
to be all those factors that affect growth in health such as educa-
tion, social cost of carbon, to name a few. Nobel laureate Myrdal
(1963) also argued that production is a circular and cumulative cau-
sation process, implying that income growth alone cannot fully re-
flect growth in health. I therefore argue that we should revise our
current theoretical approach towards discounting such that our as-
sumptions are better representatives of our economic system. Fur-
thermore, it seems that, in order to account for the inter-dependence
of the different sectors of the economy, there is need to go beyond a
2-dimensional health/wealth model.
Notably, models for vaccination, in general, should consider herd-
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immunity benefits through the indirect protection of nonvaccinated
individuals, and the size of this effect will differ between different
vaccinated cohorts. In such a dynamic model, consequently, the
ICERs will change from year to year even under equal discount-
ing since herd-immunity is dependent on the changing proportion
of vaccinated individuals. So, besides changes in cost-effectiveness
over various cohorts due to discounting, crucial changes in cost-
effectiveness will become apparent because of crucial changes in
vaccination coverage and epidemiology that quickly overrule varia-
tions due to discounting. In conslusion, I suggest the consideration
of an n-commodity intertemporal economy with the variability of
intertemporal indifferences being captured by a measure-theoretic
probability distribution.
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Chapter 7
A Relaxation of Invariance
1 Given the lack of theoretical defensibility of an equal discount rate
for costs and health outcomes argued, this chapter relaxes the as-
sumption of a commodity-invariant discount rate. Moreover, it is
often empirically remarked that individuals do not coordinate their
intertemporal preferences with pricing choices (Amir and Ariely,
2007, Frederick and Loewenstein, 2008, Kahneman and Varey, 1991,
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993). Frederick and Loewenstein (2008),
among others, found that intertemporal preferences generally do not
have the expected mapping properties on intertemporal willingness-
to-pay; i.e. higher (intertemporal) preferences do not generally re-
flect higher willingness-to-pay. As a result, time preferences for a
certain commodity and for income, say, generally do not allow for
inferences on time preferences for the marginal value of that com-
modity in terms of income.
Consequently, I assume a set of n-commodity-specific discount func-
tions and provide a matrix-vector representation of marginal sub-
stitutions based on a model consistent expectation. Since we are
1Based on
PAROUTY MBY, VISSER S AND POSTMA MJ (2013) A consistent relaxation
of the consumption invariant rate in the discounted-utility model Theoretical
Economic Letters, accepted
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concerned with marginals, one need not necessarily specify the “ab-
solute” functions, per se, but rather the relative change of a function
compared to another. My model, being valid in cases of negative
discount rates as well, derives from a more general concept. Our
conceptualisation gained popularity, mostly among physicists, from
Einstein’s general theory of relativity in which he considered a set of
coordinate system where the metric tensor defined the type of space,
flat or curved etcetera. In our case, we note that some function of
well-being across time for an n-commodity economy can be geomet-
rically represented by a function of the n-dimensional commodity
space where each coordinate changes with time according to some
specific function. With regards to the coordinate transformations, I
shall assume that production processes of n different commodities
are equivalent to some value-gaining processes such as Rae’s instru-
ments (Rae, 1834), where the value gaining processes are, possibly,
dissimilar. Thus a single point can be infinitely characterised by al-
ternative time-dependent coordinate systems. Section 7.1 provides
a theorem of the representation which I prove by induction.
Using arguments such as consistency in intertemporal choices and
intercommodity wise, we then have a cyclical representation of marginal
valuations. Cyclical mechanisms describing the economy have, for
the past few decades, gained the attention of several economists (Leon-
tief, 1986, Sraffa, 1960). The simplicity of the mathematics of input-
output systems has led to extending such systems to open ones as
well as to intertemporal ones by adding an additional growth term.
An important facet in input-output systems generally (if not always)
includes some arguments of equivalence relation. For example, Sraffa’s
system equates the value (price times quantity) of a product of each
industry to the value of all goods and services absorbed by this same
industry2. In our case, we first equate commodity i’s current input
quantities to it’s future quantity specified by some growth function.
Although the quantities of commodities vary stochastically, as a first
2See appendix for a brief description of Sraffa’s system
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approach, I propose a model-consistent expectation that assumes
that commodities evolve along deterministic (expected) functions of
time 3. Section 7.2 provides a visual derivation based on some uni-
form measure of the commodities or purely on physical quantities
of the commodities.
Our representation however allows for differential discounting which
is a major debate in health economics. I shall mainly examplify our
representation by assuming that health is a commodity4. Further-
more, the representation also enables one to incorporate externalities
in cost-effectiveness analyses. As such one might want to investigate
the cost-effectiveness with regards to net-monetary gains as well as
increased life expectancy or increased standards of life, say. Given
that some economic transactions are known to increase income but
decrease quality of life or life expectancy, say, I suggest that policy
makers should account for externalities. Section 7.3 introduces il-
lustrations with such marginal valuations and section 7.4 concludes.
7.1 A covariance representation of coordi-
nate transformations
Suppose that we have an n-dimensional function, sayw(q) described
by two sets of coordinate systems, say (q01; q
0
2; : : : ; q
0
n) and (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 ; : : : ; q
T
n )
where the coordinate transformation is given by qTi = f (q
0
i ; T )
with i = 1 : : : n, say. Since a differential, dw, is uniquely char-
acterised in the q0-frame of reference as well as uniquely charac-
terised in the qT -frame of reference, one could consider a differ-
ential, dq0 $ dq01; dq02; : : : ; dq0n which can also be characterised
by dqT1 ; dq
T
2 ; : : : ; dq
T
n . Assuming that we know the set of partial
3Throughout this chapter, subscripts shall denote commodities and superscripts
shall denote time.
4We do not consider health as a commodity but shall however assume the latter
for representative purposes given current debates that differential discounting
might be warranted for Health Technology Assessments.
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derivatives in the q0-frame of reference, @q0i =@q
0
j ; i; j = 1 : : : n; as
well as in the qT -frame of reference, @qTi =@q
T
j ; i; j = 1 : : : n;we can
form a matrix with those known components such that the eigenvec-
tor of that matrix, corresponding to an eigenvalue 1, represents the
bijective coordinate transformation components, @q
T
i
@q0i
; i = 1 : : : n.
We then have a matrix-vector representation of partial derivatives
since we are simply concerned with the derivative of an axis with
respect to another (not necessarily orthogonal here).
Theorem 7.1.1. Suppose that we have an n-dimensional space char-
acterized by 2 sets of n-dimensional coordinates, q0 and qT , then,
defining vtij by
@qtj
@qti
, the matrixX = (xij) i; j = 1::n given by,
1) xij = v
0
ij if i < j
2) xij = v
T
ji if i > j
3) xij = 1 
j 1X
i=1
v0ij  
nX
j=j+1
vTij if i = j
has an eigenvalue of 1 that corresponds to the eigenvector5 e =
(
@qT1
@q01
;
@qT2
@q02
; : : : ; @q
T
n
@q0n
)
That is
0BBB@
1 Pnj=2 vT1j v012    v01n
vT12 1 
P1
i=1 v
0
i2  
Pn
j=3 v
T
2j    v02n
...
... . . .
...
vT1n v
T
2n    1 
Pn 1
i=1 v
0
in
1CCCA
0BBBBB@
@qT1
@q01
@qT2
@q02...
@qTn
@q0n
1CCCCCA
5The vector might, as well, be representative of scalars, such as a tensor of rank 0.
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=0BBBBB@
@qT1
@q01
@qT2
@q02...
@qTn
@q0n
1CCCCCA
Proof. Suppose there exists a matrix,X; that is non-zero and non-
diagonal, given by
1) xij = v
0
ij if i < j
2) xij = v
T
ji if i > j
3) xij = 1 
j 1X
i=1
v0ij  
nX
j=j+1
vTij if i = j
suchXe0=e0 where e = (f
 
qT1

; f
 
qT2

; : : : f
 
qTn

)with f
 
qTj

=
@qTj =@q
0
j and v
t
ij =
@qtj
@qti
; i; j = 1 : : : n; t = 0; T .
Then, f(qT1 ) satisfies
Pn
j=1 x1jf(q
T
j ) = f(q
T
1 ). i.e.
nX
j=1
x1jf(q
T
j ) =
 
1 
nX
j=2
vT1j
!
f
 
qT1

+v012f
 
qT2

+  +v01nf
 
qTn

=
@qT1
@q01
 
nX
j=2
@qTj
@qT1
@qT1
@q01
+

@q02
@q01

f
 
qT2

+   +

@q0n
@q01

f
 
qTn

=
@qT1
@q01
= f
 
qT1

Assume that
Pn
j=1 x(i 1)jf(q
T
j ) = f(q
T
(i 1)) is true.
Then
Pn
j=1 xijf(q
T
j ), given by
nX
j=1
xijf
 
qTj

=
i 1X
j=1
xijf
 
qTj

+ xiif
 
qTi

+
nX
j=i+1
xijf
 
qTj

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=
i 1X
j=1
vTjif
 
qTj

+
 
1 
j 1X
i=1
v0ij  
nX
j=j+1
vTij
!
f
 
qTi

+
nX
j=i+1
v0ijf
 
qTj

=
i 1X
j=1
@qTi
@qTj
@qTj
@q0j
+
 
1 
j 1X
i=1
@q0j
@q0i
 
nX
j=j+1
@qTj
@qTi
!
@qTi
@q0i
+
nX
j=i+1
@q0j
@q0i
@qTj
@q0j
=
i 1X
j=1
@qTi
@q0j
+
 
1 
i 1X
j=1
@q0i
@q0j
 
nX
j=j+1
@qTj
@qTi
!
@qTi
@q0i
+
nX
j=i+1
@qTj
@q0i
=
i 1X
j=1
@qTi
@q0j
+
 
@qTi
@q0i
 
i 1X
j=1
@qTi
@q0j
 
nX
j=j+1
@qTj
@q0i
!
+
nX
j=i+1
@qTj
@q0i
=
@qTi
@q0i
= f
 
qTi

is also true.
By induction, we conclude thatX, given by
1) xij = v
0
ij if i < j
2) xij = v
T
ji if i > j
3) xij = 1 
j 1X
i=1
v0ij  
nX
j=j+1
vTij if i = j
Which is non-zero and non-diagonal satisfiesXe0=e08 i; j = 1 : : : n
where
e = (f
 
qT1

; f
 
qT2

; : : : f
 
qTn

)with f
 
qTj

= @qTj =@q
0
jand v
t
ij =
@qtj
@qti
; i; j = 1 : : : n; t = 0; T
6We now note some properties of the matrix-vector system which
makes the usage fairly attractive for economists.
6Note that the theorem is consistent with Cramer’s rule.
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Notes
1. All the elements of our matrix are partial differentials valued
with time being constant (i.e. each components of the matrix
are specific to one and only one time point, either t=0 or t=T).
2. The elements of the vector are partial differentials relating to
a single axis (i.e. each of the elements of the vector is spe-
cific to one and only one commodity i, i=either 1 or 2 or. . . or
n). Furthermore, the growth vector, say f
 
qTi

=
@qTi
@q0i
is not
specified and the chain rule allowsf
 
qT1

to be, say, an expo-
nential growth while f
 
qT2

to be, say, a linear growth, and
the general solution of the system of equations is given by:
vTij
v0ij
= f
 
qTj

=f
 
qTi

(7.1)
7.2 A derivation with commodities
Suppose that we have an n-commodity economy where the mea-
sures of each commodity evolve through time t, each according
to specific growth functions, f (qti), i = 1 : : : n. Without loss of
generality, I suppose that the commodity bundle is t 2 
n, the
n-dimensional Euclidean orthant and the physical quantity of com-
modity i at time t is denoted qti. Given that we have a closed econ-
omy, the ratio of any arbitrary commodity i to another arbitrary com-
modity j, i; j = 1 : : : n is fully specified at all times. Alternatively,
given a system of ratios of all commodities to other commodities at
different times, a unique vector of growths exists for each of the n
commodities through time. My quest in this section is to specify a
matrix whose entries are the ratios of commodity i to commodity j,
i; j = 1 : : : n at specific times, say t = 0 and t = T that would
correspond to the growth functions f
 
qTi

; i = 1 : : : n.
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Suppose that we now, time t = 0, have q0i of commodity i, i =
1 : : : n which grows up to time T to qTi . I define the growth func-
tion, f
 
qTi

; i = 1 : : : n to be the ratio of the future quantity of
commodity i to its current quantity.
f
 
qTi

=
qTi
q0i
(7.2)
Let 4q0ij be the quantity of commodity i at time t = 0 that will
exchanged for (used in the production of) commodity j, at time t =
T . Splitting commodity i into n parts at the present time, we have
q0i =
nX
j=1
4q0ij (7.3)
Where4q0ij is the part of commodity i now that will make up for the
part commodity j in the future. At that future time, T, the quantity
of commodity j, qTj , j = 1 : : : i : : : n, is composed of the total parts
from all n commodities, which at time t = 0 were allocated to its
future production, 4q0ij; i = 1 : : : n, each forwarded to time T at
their respective growth rates, f
 
qTi

; i = 1 : : : n. The quantity of
commodity j at time t = T is then given by
qTj =
nX
i=1
f
 
qTi
4q0ij (7.4)
Now, from equations 7.2 and 7.3, we have
f
 
qTi

=
f
 
qTi
Pn
j=14q0ijPn
j=14q0ij
=
Pn
j=1 f
 
qTi
4q0ijPn
j=14q0ij
(7.5)
And from equations 7.2 and 7.4, we have
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f
 
qTi

=
Pn
j=1 f
 
qTj
4q0ji
q0i
=
Pn
j=1 f
 
qTj
4q0jiPn
j=14q0ij
(7.6)
Equating equation 7.5 with 7.6,
nX
j=1
f
 
qTi
4q0ij = nX
j=1
f
 
qTj
4q0ji
!
nX
j=1
f
 
qTi
4q0ij   nX
j=1
f
 
qTj
4q0ji = 0
!
nX
j=1
 
f
 
qTi
4q0ij   f  qTj 4q0ji = 0
Let us consider the solution f
 
qTi
4q0ij = f  qTj 4q0ji 8 i; j. This
solution is the equivalence relation that I shall investigate. In the
next section, the continuous version of the equivalence relation,4qTij =
4qTji 8 i; j; is shown to be a direct consequence of a major assump-
tion in time preferences, namely the welfare-preserving rate. How-
ever, restricting ourselves to physical quantities for the time being,
assuming that f
 
qTi
4q0ij = f  qTj 4q0ji 8j, we have f(qT1 )4q01i4q0i1 =
f(qT2 )4q02i
4q0i2
=    = f(q
T
n )4q0ni
4q0in
implying that we can write f
 
qTi

,
rather than a ratio of sums, as a sum of ratios7, i.e. equation 7.6
becomes f
 
qTi

=
Pn
j=1
 4q0ji=4q0ijf  qTj . Thus, with f(qTj )4q0ji4q0ij =
f
 
qTi
8j, we have a system of linear equations which we can write
in terms of a matrix of ratios, sayX = (xij) where xij =
4q0ji
4q0ij
i; j =
7This follows from Euclid’s proposition 12 (The elements, Book V). That is:”If
any number of magnitudes be proportional, as one of the antecedents is to
one of the consequents, so will all the antecedents be to all the consequents”
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1::n and a vector of growths, say e = (e1; e2; : : : en)=(f
 
qT1

;
f
 
qT2

; : : : f
 
qTn

), such that Xe0=e0 . I shall use the transpose no-
tation to denote column vectors. Further, note that all elements of
the Matrix X are ratios valued in the present time only, that is time
t = 0.
Furthermore, given that we have a closed economy, with
f(qTj )4q0ji
4q0ij
=
f
 
qTi
! f(qTi )4q0ij4q0ji = f  qTj , our columns are also specified8. That
is, given an entry in the upper triangular matrix, say xij; j > i, an
entry in the lower triangular matrix, xji, is also specified such that
xijf
 
qTj

= xjif
 
qTi
 8 i; j: Since it is more of our interest to con-
sider how a single ratio changes, we wish to maintain the numerator
and denominator so that they represent the ratio of the same com-
modities; but at different times. Thus if xij =
4q0ji
4q0ij
j > i, and
remembering that xijf
 
qTj

= xjif
 
qTi
 8i; j, we let xji = 4qTji4qTij
so that it is only the time at which we consider the ratios that is
changed9.
Next, with f
 
qTj

= 1:f
 
qTj

implying that a unit of commod-
ity j grows to f
 
qTj

, I add a further constraint on the diagonal
entries. Given that we have Ie0=e0 , then we firstly require that
X = (xij) i; j = 1::n has an eigenvalue of one corresponding to
the eigenvector, e = (f
 
qT1

; f
 
qT2

; : : : f
 
qTn

). We thus require
that each of the columns of our matrix sum to 1, which is a con-
8Analogous to Sraffa’s note relating to a system in a self-replacing state (page 5
of the production of commodity by means of commodity), our formulation
presupposes a system undergoing indefinite growth. As a result such a state
is feasible merely by changing the ratios in which the individual equations
enter it.
9To maintain numerator and denominator of xij and xji, note that
4qTji
4q0ij can be
achieved by forwarding the numerator of the time zero ratio or by discounting
the denominator of the time t ratio, i.e.
4qTji
4q0ij =
4q0ji
4q0ij f
 
qTj

=
4qTji
4qTij
f
 
qTi

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sequence of equation 7.3. We therefore condition on the diagonal
entries so that xjj equal to 1  
P
i; i 6=j xij . Thus we have specified
all entries of our matrix of ratios such that Xe0=e0 . That is,
0BBBBBB@
1 Pnj=2 4qTj14qT1j 4q0214q012    4q0n14q01n
4qT21
4qT12
1 P1i=1 4q02i4q0i2  Pnj=3 4qTj24qT2j    4q0n24q02n
...
... . . .
...
4qTn1
4qT1n
4qTn2
4qT2n
   1 Pn 1i=1 4q0ni4q0in
1CCCCCCA
x
0BBB@
f
 
qT1

f
 
qT2

...
f
 
qTn

1CCCA
=
0BBB@
f
 
qT1

f
 
qT2

...
f
 
qTn

1CCCA
Thus far, however, we have not rigorously specified our matrix en-
tries and vector entries. If we assume continuity in measures of the
quantities of the commodity bundle at all times, without loss of gen-
erality, we could consider partial differentials rather than ratio of
quantities10. Furthermore, such continuity assumptions often allow
the incorporation of some economic definitions fairly well. For ex-
ample, marginal substitution or marginal transformation can be well
accommodated for. While the latter is not a requirement, it hardly
seems unacceptable.
10For example
qTj
qTi
qTi =q
0
i  @q
T
j
@qTi
@qTi =@q
0
i ;
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I shall let f (qti) = @q
t
i=@q
0
i ; i = 1:::n; t = 0; T and consequently
redefine the terms of our matrix,
4qtji
4qtij ; i; j = 1::n; t = 0; T in the
traditional partial differential sense. Since the entries of X, only in-
volve the pairwise exchanges,
4qtji
4qtij ; i; j = 1 : : : n; t = 0; T , i.e. the
change in quantity of commodity i at time t that comes from com-
modity j at time 0 divided by the change in quantity of commodity
j at time t that comes from commodity i at time 0 , then given that
@qtj=@q
0
j = f
 
qtj

,
4qtji
4qtij can effectively be stated in a much sim-
pler fashion; i.e. the change in commodity j with respect to com-
modity i at time t11,
@qtj
@qti
. Next, suppose we wish to find the matrix
inputs at a given time t = T that corresponds to the vector e.
Letting vTij =
@qTj
@qTi
, the partial derivative of commodity j with respect
to commodity i at the specific time T, we have the representation
theorem.
7.3 An illustration in welfare
The non-specificity of an ”absolute” function in our space opens
doors for the use of the matrix system in various other sectors and
for different other purposes. The mathematics of marginal rate of
transformation and of marginal rate of substitution, being simply
that of marginals or partial differentials, in this subsection, we wish
to consider the term ”marginal value” as input in our system. In
order to justify the matrix approach for marginal substitutions, it
is necessary to first make various simplifying assumptions, contin-
gent on intergenerational equity. I shall follow Bergson’s approach
to the latter: namely through the selection of the welfare function,
W (q) (Bergson, 1938).
11The use of partial differentials in the system provides a broader set of possi-
bilities of definitions. However, restricting ourselves to the purpose of this
chapter, we treat the usage as being a continuity of proportional change.
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Although all social welfare functions have been much scorned for
assuming interpersonal comparability of utility, intergenerational de-
cision making seems unfeasible without making some assumptions
about interpersonal comparability. Limiting cases of general so-
cial welfare functions are the Utilitarian social welfare which is a
sum of utilities and the Rawlsian social welfare which is based on a
maxi-min strategy12 in which the welfare of the worst-off individu-
als ought to be maximized (Rawls, 1972). In this illustration, I shall
assume the different discount rates are welfare-preserving.
The assumption of welfare-preserving rates is instructive because
it offers a ”spacial” expansion of the traditional framework for the
social rate of time preference, the srtp. We recall that we have an
economy that is closed and is composed of n commodities only;
and we further require that our fictitious society satisfies the neces-
sary assumptions required for the existence of an intercommodity
and intertemporal indifference curve such as the Von Newman and
Morgenstern (1953) rationality axioms and the axioms presented by
Ok and Masatlioglu (2003), for intercommodity and intertemporal
conditions respectively.
Definition 7.3.1. Let the social welfare function, at time t, beW t 
W (qt1; q
t
2; : : : ; q
t
n) where the commodity bundle is 
t 2 
n, the n-
dimensional Euclidean orthant defined before.
Definition 7.3.2. Let the (negative) marginal substitution for com-
modity j between its future quantity and its current quantity be de-
noted as f
 
QTi

=
W ti
W 0i
=  @q0i
@qti

dW=0
, where W ti = @W=@q
t
i .
Definition 7.3.3. We further denote the (negative) social marginal
rate of substitution between commodity j and commodity i at time  ,
as vij  @W=@q

i
@W=@qj
,
Remarks. Definition 7.3.3, having a bijective nature, should remind
us of the equivalence relation from the previous section; f
 
qTi
4q0ij =
12We discuss this in chapter 10
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f
 
qTj
4q0ji 8 i; j. However, in order to use the representation for
preferences, it is not only required that we make assumptions of
measurability for utility at all times but it is also necessary to as-
sume the right conditions so that operations on quantities are valid
for utility functions as well. Thus, to fully set the stage for the matrix
approach, we shall require an independence condition introduced by
Leontief (1947). To do so, we impose the equivalence lemma of
Stigum (1967):
Definition 7.3.4. Let
 
K ;KT

be a partition of the set of variables,K,
and let bK be any set of non-negative quantities of the variables in
K . The group of variables,K , is separable in W from a variable
Kk if and only if the correspondence, , defined by 
bK ; KT =
fK W  K ;KT  > W (bK ;KT )g, is independent of qk, the quan-
tity of the variable Kk.
Remarks. This definition is equivalent to the condition that the
marginal rates of substitution at time  , vij  @W=@q

i
@W=@qj
, is indepen-
dent of qtk8t; i; j 6= k (Blackorby et al, 1973). If W (K) is twice
differentiable, then the condition is equivalent to
@vij
@qtk
= 0. Koop-
mans (1960) formulated the latter differently, though with similar
implications. In some other classes of welfare models, time prefer-
ences are influenced by current consumption. As such, the marginal
rate of substitution between commodities at time T and T’ is de-
pendent on consumption at time T” and, consequently, well-being is
not constant through time. However, our system considers only two
time points and does not specify any absolute n-dimensional func-
tion. Consequently, assuming that the 2 sets of partial derivatives
represent 2 time points, intertemporal marginal substitutions might
be obtained simply from definition 7.3.2.
Since we again have two sets of partial differentials where each set,
in turn, relate to each other through partial differentials, we can
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write, with such definitions,
nX
j=1
xijf
 
qTj

=
i 1X
j=1
xijf
 
qTj

+ xiif
 
qTi

+
nX
j=i+1
xijf
 
qTj

where xij is defined as in theorem 7.1.1. and we have a consistent
representation of marginal substitutions, which is based on the well-
known framework for the srtp. We merely provide a matrix-vector
terminology for ratios of a bundle of measures growing through
time, whether the measure is physical quantity or a measure of pref-
erence that adhere to certain assumptions. With other welfare mod-
els, adjustments for dw are required ex-ante since our representation
builds on the basis differential, dq.
7.3.1 An application in health economic evaluations
The need for differential discounting in health economics was seen
in the first part of this thesis to be, not only ethically correct, but
also, to be empirically valid and theoretically motivated. Policies
in the Netherlands and Belgium currently suggest differential dis-
counting for health outcomes. We have also argued that inclusion of
the pure rate, the rate at which future utility is discounted, is circu-
lar reasoning when discounting future lives is concerned, motivat-
ing a differential rate for health. While education, for example, is
commonly known, with several empirical evidences, to boost both
health and income, other economic activities are known, on the one
hand, to be favourable to economic growth, while, on the other hand,
to impact negatively on health; thus challenging the commonly as-
sumed perfect correlation between health and income that justifies
equal discounting of costs and effects.
This subsection focusses on the marginal values of health in terms
of other commodities. Although we do not claim that health alone
should be a measure of social welfare, we suggest that if, as Myrdal
stated, production is a circular and cumulative sequence of causa-
tions (Myrdal, 1963) then health is at least one of the explanatory
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indicators of social welfare. This subsection shows that our theorem
applies to current health discounting theory; i.e by assuming that our
welfare function summarises a closed economy composed of health
and income only.
Consistency with current health discounting
In order to validate our system with current health economic dis-
counting, restricting ourselves, again, to welfare preserving rates for
money and health, we shall use health economic literature notations
(for this subsection only). Assuming that individuals make rational
choices, we can assume that a three-dimensional indifference curve
always exists. The health measures proposed have, most often, been
a unique measure which is the combination of quality of life and life
years, the QALY.
In case of an economy which is composed of only 2 commodities,
the QALY and income only, our system provides the same result
as current health economic approaches. In order to illustrate our
matrix approach, we let commodity 1 and 2 be health, h, and money,
m, respectively and use a one year time period, (t = 0; t = T = 1),
for this illustration. Let our social welfare function be summarised
over only money streams and health streams, say W (mt; ht) and
the marginal value of future money in terms of current money be
denoted by
W 1m
W 0m
=  @m
0
@m1

dW=0
=
1
(1 + rm)
And let the marginal value of future health in terms of current health
be denoted by
W 1h
W 0h
=  @h
0
@h1

dW=0
=
1
(1 + rh)
Since we have only two commodities in such an economy, we need
only consider one partial differential for the marginal substitution
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among commodities, say the (negative) social marginal rate of sub-
stitution between money and health.
W tm
W th
=  @m
t
@ht

dW=0
= vt
where W th = @W=@h
t is the marginal social welfare from an in-
finitesimal increase in health at time t and W tm = @W=@m
t is the
marginal social welfare from an infinitesimal increase in money at
time t.
From above theorem, in the case n = 2, we get the following system:
(1  v1) v0
v1 (1  v0)
 
1+rh
1+rm

=

1+rh
1+rm

with solution,
v0
v1
=
1+rh
1+rm
: (7.7)
Note that we only expand one row of the matrix system to arrive at
the solution due to linear independence, i.e.
(1  v1)(1+rh)+v0(1+rm) = 1+rh
!  v1(1+rh)+v0(1+rm) = 0
! v
0
v1
=
1+rh
1+rm
That is, “The marginal value of one good (health or income) in
terms of another is the same whatever the route by which they are
compared”, as Gravelle and Smith (2001) stated. By considering
the NPV of an intervention from two equivalent ways, Gravelle and
Smith showed in a very straight forward way that v0 and v1 are re-
lated in the same linear fashion as above. They considered a single
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one year period13 example where an intervention changes present
and future costs by 4c0 and 4c1 respectively and the quantities of
present and future health by4h0 and4h1 respectively. Firstly, they
valued health effects in each period in terms of income and then dis-
counted the future value at the rate of interest on income, rm. The
NPV of the intervention is given by
v14h1 1
(1 + rm)
+ v04h0  4c1 1
(1+rm)
 4c0:
Secondly, they converted the change in future health into an equiv-
alent change in current health and then applied the value of current
health in terms of current income. This gives an NPV of
v04h1 1
(1 + rh)
+ v04h0  4c1 1
(1+rm)
 4c0:
Then, by their consistency argument, equating the two NPV’s yields
v0
v1
=
1+rh
1+rm
as we have found in equation 7.7. The reason why the matrix method
is similar to the NPV method is that they are both solutions to the
same problem. The aim was to find a relationship between v0 and v1
with the given constraints that @h1 = @h0(1+rh), @m1 = @m0(1+rm),
and vt = W
t
m
W th
. Thus in order to be indifferent to the gain of (1 + rh)
of future health at time t = 1, consistency requires that we could
now, at time zero, hold either 1 unit of health only or

v0
v1

units of
income only or, in our case, we hold both income and health in the
proportions: (1  v1) units of health and v0 units of wealth. We see
that, in the example given by Gravelle and Smith, in order to have
4h1 of health at time t = 1, they either hold v04h1 1
(1+rm)
of health
13Gravelle and Smith considered a period of time t=0 and a period of time t=1 and
the definition they used was two-period while we use specific times t=0 and
t=1 and hence assume a single period. The derivation however follows.
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now or v14h1 1
(1+rh)
of income now. Thus, our 2x2 matrix and the
NPV approaches provide the same results.
However, the matrix approach provides the opportunity for similar
investigations in higher dimensions. Assuming interventions that
improve health quality and interventions that increase life durations
might also deserve differential discount rates from an ethical point
of view, then we suggest that an array-cost-effectiveness analysis
might be more theoretically defensible with the assumption of a
commodity-specific discount rate.
7.4 Discussion
Although the assumptions of general equilibrium are known to al-
locate resources in a Pareto efficient manner, a major discussion is
that a competitive market does not consider the growth of the econ-
omy in a sustainable manner. Pareto optimality is often said to fail
to consider distributions among intertemporal societies in an ethi-
cal manner. It is thus unclear whether capital markets function in
society’s interest over periods spanning multiple generations. More-
over, discounting of human lives at the SDR has already been argued
to lack the theoretical motivations. An alternative approach is pro-
posed in this chapter by relating growth rates across commodities.
My approach resembles, to some degree, that of the original cyclical
mechanisms that was proposed in Quesnay’s Tableau economique
(1759). I, however, rather than equating the “physical quantity on
the side of the means of production to that on the side of the product,
both of which consist of the same product” (Sraffa, 1960), allow for
a non-fixed timing of the production process similar to Rae’s instru-
ments, which I equate through Euclid’s proposition 12. It might not
be unimportant to note that, while this chapter addresses consistency
in preferences, using growths in physical quantities of a single prod-
uct, investigations on a sustainable production-consumption cycle
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seem fairly attractive. Alternatively, plugging in rates of time pref-
erences as growth parameters of different commodities might aid in
investigating consistency among social discount rates.
As Riccardo’s methodology in devising rates of profits of a farmer
by singling out corn as a ‘basic’ commodity, we choose to, rather,
single out health measures as basic commodity. Analogous to Ric-
cardo’s conclusion with that regards, I propose that “it is the growth
in health that regulate the growth in other trades/commodities”. As
a generic measure for health, the quality-adjusted life year (QALY)
is often used. While the QALY is a multiplicative combination of
health quality and life duration which is also consistent with health
states that are worse than death or have zero duration of life, the
assumption of linear utility of duration is often weakened for sim-
plicity and challenges the actual discounting of the generic concept.
We therefore suggest that the QALY be treated as its two differ-
ent constituents, namely quality of life and the life year; which
also strengthens the idea of an array-cost-effectiveness analysis. As
such, our representation theorem opens the route to formally in-
vestigate potentially different discount rates for quality of life and
life years which could especially be important for evaluating cost-
effectiveness of life saving and life improving medical interventions
differently.
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7.a Appendix: Sraffa’s production for sub-
sistence approach to health
“Money makes money and the money that money makes makes more
money”:-Benjamin Franklin (Hollis Page Harman, 1999). As a re-
sult of a society’s production of income, we shall regard, in this
Annex, income to be a commodity. The other two commodities that
we shall consider to be contributing in the production of income are
quality of life and life years so that a society with good health gener-
ates more income than one with poor health. Alternatively, a society
with more income can make better investments towards life duration
and quality of life. Furthermore, a society with no income and qual-
ity of life is assumed to perish, which is a reasonable assumption in
today’s world where the prime method of purchase is money. The
three commodities, income, quality of life and life duration can thus
be considered to be exchanged for one another to enable society to
maintain itself.
To illustrate Sraffa’s concept, we shall omit the value of time in this
annex and consider the above mentioned 3-commodity economy to
be closed. A short description of Sraffa’s model for “production for
subsistence” is as described below. Consider Quality of Life, Life
years and Income as the commodities and let the annually produced
Quality of Life in society be q1, that of Life years be q2and that of
income be q3; where part of the input of a commodity is transformed
to part of the output of the other goods (including itself) and vice-
versa. Furthermore, let qij be the annual quantity of good i used in
producing qj .
These quantities are assumed to be known by Sraffa. The unknowns
to be determined are the values of the units of commodities, say
p1; p2 and p3, which, if adopted, restore the initial position. We
therefore have, since our economy is closed:
129
p1q11 + p2q21 + p3q31 = p1q1
p1q12 + p2q22 + p3q32 = p2q2
p1q13 + p2q23 + p3q33 = p3q3
And, analogous to our columns summing to one due to the initial
sum of all splits of a commodity should make the initial composi-
tion of that commodity, the same condition should be satisfied in
Sraffa’s matrix since his system is in a self-replacing state. There-
fore, the conditions
P
all j qij = qi8i are always satisfied. In Sraffa’s
words, “The sum of the first column is equal to the first line, that of
the second column to the second line, and so on.” Then lastly, one
commodity’s value is taken as the standard value and it’s price is
made equal to one. It doesn’t seem unreasonable to consider the
value of income to be that of money. Thus, taking the price of in-
come to be unity, we are left with three minus one unknowns which
leaves 2 linearly independent equations uniquely determining p1 and
p2.
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Chapter 8
Probability Measures
The n-commodity economy presented, in the previous chapter, is
however deterministic. To add probability measures, two method-
ologies were apparent with considerations on either the matrix en-
tries or the vector entries. In order to attain face validation ( valida-
tion due to conformity with current theoretical posits), I choose to
consider the variability due the psychological limitations towards in-
tertemporal choices. A key issue in modern neuroscience is the asso-
ciation that an individual’s perception bears with her neural events (Crick
and Koch, 2003). Patterns of intertemporal indifferences have cap-
tured the interest of psychologists and economists for several decades.
Procrastination, addiction and willingness to save are a few observed
behaviors involving time trade-offs (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005). I
shall thus assume that variability is centered around the weight func-
tions in vector entries; where we shall expect an individual to be
indifferent () between an amount, q0 now and an amount Q(T )
at time t = T to place a discount weight, w(T ) 2 (0; 1) such that
q0  w(T )Q(T ).
A very general discount weight function is of the form, w(t) =
e (t)(t) where (t) is the time-perception function and (t) is the
preference rate function. Several authors have sought the proper
functional form by eliciting either (t) or (t) or both. Albrecht and
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Weber (Albrecht and Weber, 1995), for example, proposed that in-
dividuals have a non-linear time preception function. The weight,
w(t), they proposed is given by (t) = 8t and (t) is the non-
linear time perception function indicating how fast time is perceived
to pass in an individuals mind. Other authors assumed a linearly de-
clining discount rate function, (t) = a+ b(t) (Cropper et al, 1992)
or a discontinuous hyperbolic discount weight function (Bazelon,
2002, Beutels et al, 2008) or an implicit function for the weights,
w(t) such as Loewenstein and Prelec’s w(t) = 1
(1+gt)
h
g
(Loewen-
stein and Prelec, 1992).
While there exist a wide body of literature suggesting the use of a
single discount function, a series of studies suggest that cognitive
considerations might explain the lack of convergence in empirical
investigations. For example, our primate friend, Saguinus oedipus,
and common marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, are known to differ in
levels of temporal discounting (Rosati et al, 2006). Among the hu-
man species, we found in chapter 5 that health states, education
level, to name a few, are endogeneous determinants of time prefer-
ences. Other studies have found that the speed of the internal clock is
linked to the concentration of dopamine in the basal ganglia (Meck,
1996). However, similar to Samuelson (1937), I assume that the
disparate psychological factors adding variability across an individ-
ual’s intertemporal indifference can be condensed into the variabil-
ity around her expected intertemporal indifference amount function.
Then, I can analyse the sentence:”In general, individuals prefer to
consume now than to consume in the future” with focus on the word
”in general” and reformulate the latter sentence in a more statisti-
cally interpretable form. To do so, I condense all the variability into
a mathematically tractable parameter; i.e. into the variability of the
specious present.
Strictly speaking, the present is an infinitely small time interval sep-
arating the past and the future. However, it is argued that the per-
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ceived present is an interval which need not be infinitely small, a
concept first observed in 1882 (Clay in Holly and Grush, 2009). As
Einstein described ralativity with the faster passage of time when
one sits in the company of a beautiful woman, it would also not
be implausible that, everything else being constant, cognitive pro-
cesses allow the ”present time” to be viewed as a random variable.
Furthermore, since the passage of time allows any future time in-
terval to be constructed by a sequence of the individual’s specious
presents, then we have a time-inhomogeneous stochastic process
similar to (Parouty et al, In Preparation). The assumption that an
individuals perception of a future interval is a sequence of random
specious presents coupled with the assumption that the individual is
expected to place a weight on future consumption are sufficient to
formulate a probabilistic distribution for intertemporal indifference.
8.1 Distribution derivation
The assignment of probability measures is done by deriving a maxi-
mum entropy distribution for the probability that an individual/animal
is indifferent between some quantity Q(T ) = q at time t = T and
a given quantity Q(0) = q0 now. First, I write our expectation in
an elegant language, so that, given an initial amount, q0, now, the
expected indifference amount at time t is
E(Q(t)) =
q0
w(t)
(8.1)
With equation 8.1 being the uncondional expection of Q(t), the
Radon-Nykodym theorem asserts the existence of a conditional in-
finitesimal expectation (Varadhan, 2001). DefiningQ(t+h) Q(t) =
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hQ(t), the latter is given by
lim
h#0
1
h
E(hQ(t) j Q(t) = q)
= lim
h#0
1
h
(E(Q(t+ h) j Q(t) = q)  q)
= lim
h#0
q
h

1 +
 w`(t)
w(t)

h+ o(h)  1

= lim
h#0
q
h
 w`(t)
w(t)

h+ o(h)

= q
 w`(t)
w(t)

(8.2)
Next, it is important to note that an individual or animal will only
express a time preference provided she perceives time to pass ( or
provided the interval of time that she perceives is bigger than her
specious present). Since the specious presents are random time du-
rations, we can assume that a given fixed indifference amount at a
specific time point has a random duration being equal to the individ-
ual’s specious present at that time. Furthermore, at the instant that
the next specious present begins, the indifference amount increases
continuously with certainty. Thus, I ensure that an individual’s in-
tertemporal indifference path is a continuous function of time. As
a result the process adheres to the typical characterisations of dif-
fusion processes; usually restricted by a jump constraint on their
probability measure, P (Q(t) = q j Q(0) = q0)  P (q; t). To be
more specific, for a positive  suffiently small,
lim
h#0
1
h
P (hQ(t) >  j Q(t) = q) = 0: (8.3)
Equation 8.3 ensures that the indifference path is time continuous.
For example, an individual being given an amount q0 now will al-
ways be indifferent to the same amount, q0, in any future inter-
val which lies in her specious present. It is at the instant the new
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specious present begins that the individual’s indifference path exits
the state q0 moving, at all times, along a ca´dla´g path1.
8.1.1 Probability assignment
I now wish to assign probability measures such that the surprisal or
hidden information is maximized. Surprisal maximization is the
standard principle in devising probability distributions. According
to the principle of maximum-entropy, if we have a partial knowl-
edge about a random variable( whether it is discrete or continuous,
it’s range, mean, etcetera), we first obtain a family of probability dis-
tributions that are all consistent with our information and then, we
select, from that family, the single distribution whose uncertainty is
the greatest. Most commonly used distributions are MaxEnt2 given a
current state of knowledge. For example, if we know nothing about
a system of continuous random variables except it’s range, we get
the uniform distribution, or except it’s positive mean, we get the ex-
ponential distribution, or except it’s mean and standard deviation,
we get the normal distribution, and so on.
Consequently, with the given infinitesimal mean, equation 8.2, I
devise a MaxEnt distribution for a sufficiently small time interval,
h, and thereafter projecting that distribution through time given the
constraint that, for sufficiently small h, E(hQ(t) j Q(t) = q) 
qh

 w`(t)
w(t)

, to obtain a probability distribution. Note that the in-
finitesimal distribution, at any time, would be very much depen-
dent on the weight function, w(t), at that specific time. In the small
enough time interval, h, in case of continuous intertemporal prefer-
ences, I consider the Dirac measure, 1>0(hQ(t)) which identifies3
an exit from a preference amount q in the interval (t; t + h). The
1Ca´dla´g means right continuous with left limits.
2MaxEnt is short for maximum-entropy.
31>0(hQ(t)) takes a value of 1 if hQ(t) > 0 and takes a value of 0 if
hQ(t) = 0
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Lagrangian is given by
L(P (1>0(hQ(t)) j Q(t) = q); ; )
=
Z
P (1>0(hQ(t)) j Q(t) = q) ln(P (1>0(hQ(t)) j Q(t) = q))dq
 
Z
1>0(hQ(t))P (1>0(hQ(t)) j Q(t) = q)dq   qh
 w`(t)
w(t)

 
Z
P (1>0(hQ(t)) j Q(t) = q)dq   1

Differentiating L(:) with respect to P (:) yields P (1>0(hQ(t)) j
Q(t) = q) = e  (1>0(hQ(t))) 1. Picking  and  so that P (:) is
a probability measure and E(hQ(t) j Q(t) = q) = qh

 w`(t)
w(t)

gives
P (hQ(t) = 0 j Q(t) = q) = 1  qh
 w`(t)
w(t)

(8.4)
P (hQ(t) > 0 j Q(t) = q) = qh
 w`(t)
w(t)

(8.5)
It is interesting to remark that the use of the Dirac measure above
assumes unit jumps and hence equations 8.4 and 8.5 provide a good
analogy for countable indifference amounts, such as euros4. In the
appendix of this chapter, I derive a discrete state, continuous time,
process, namely the Poisson process. Equation 8.1 however requires
that Q(t) be continuous and thus hints towards the use of differen-
tials in probability with respect to q. I do so, however, after formu-
lating the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations.
4That is, for example, given an individual’s indifference amount, Q(t) = q at
time t, the probability that in the small time interval, (t; t+h), the individual
will not demand any more money is P (hQ(t) = 0 j Q(t) = q) = 1  
qh

 w`(t)
w(t)

and the probability that the individual will demand e1 in the
interval, h, is P (hQ(t) = 1 j Q(t) = q) = qh

 w`(t)
w(t)

which is a valid
Bernoulli distribution.
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8.1.2 Differential equation
The general Chapman-Kolmogorov equation is given by
P (q; t+ h) =
Z
allz
P (q   z; t)PfhQ(t) = z j Q(t) = q   zgdz
(8.6)
In our case, since we have only two possible outcomes in the interval
h, no growth or an infinitesimal growth as specified in equation 8.2.
Our Chapman-Kolmogorov is then approximately:
P (q; t+ h) = P (hQ(t) =  j Q(t) = q   )P (q   ; t)
+P (hQ(t) = 0 j Q(t) = q)P (q; t)
= (q   )h
 w`(t)
w(t)

P (q   ; t)
+

1  qh
 w`(t)
w(t)

P (q; t)
giving
P (q; t+ h)  P (q; t)
hP (q; t)
= q
 w`(t)
w(t)

q   
q
P (q   ; t)
P (q; t)
  1

Consider the backward difference operator,ru(q) = u(q)  u(q 
). Letting g(q) = ln(q) and L(q; t) = ln(P (q; t)), the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation becomes,
P (q; t+ h)  P (q; t)
hP (q; t)
= q
 w`(t)
w(t)
 
e rg(q) rL(q;t)   1
= q
 w`(t)
w(t)

e
P1
n=1
( )n
n!
@ng(q)
@qn
+
P1
n=1
( )n
n!
@nL(q;t)
@qn   1

Now, since g(q) and L(q; t) are both assumed to be analytic and
successively differentiable upto some order, using Cauchy’s mean
value theorem, we can write
1X
n=1
( )n
n!
@ng(q)
@qn
+
1X
n=1
( )n
n!
@nL(q; t)
@qn
=  @L(q; t)
@q
  @f(q)
@q

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where f(q) is some analytic function5. The Chapman-Kolmogorov
equation can thus be written as
P (q; t+ h)  P (q; t)
hP (q; t)
= q
 w`(t)
w(t)

e 
@L(q;t)
@q
  @f(q)
@q
   1

(8.7)
Now, taking limh#0 of equation 8.7 and recalling that we used the
Dirac measure gives:
@L(q; t)
@t
= q
 w`(t)
w(t)

e 
@L(q;t)
@q
  @f(q)
@q   1

(8.8)
8.1.3 Distribution
Equation 8.8 can be readily solved through standard methods (Forsyth,
1929). We note that the equations of the tangent planes to the surface
satisfying equation 8.8 at arbitrary points l0; q0; t0 form an envelope
which is the actual surface L(q; t). Then taking @L(q;t)
@t
= '(; t),
@L(q;t)
@q
=  (q; ) and treating  as a constant, we no longer have a
partial differential equation. We can thus let l'(; t) and l (q; ) be
the solutions to each, respectively, and obtain the complete integral
which is a two parameter family of planes:
L(q; t) = l'(; t) + l (q; ) + c (8.9)
where c is a constant independent of q and t. Writing '(; t) =


 w`(t)
w(t)

, we get
l'(; t) =
Z t
0

 w`(t)
w(t)

dt
=  ln
1
w(t)
(8.10)
5Note that the assumption of a general analytic function provides more room to-
wards later formulating a normalizing constant.
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Next, with'(; t) given as above, we have  = q

e 
@L(q;t)
@q
  @f(q)
@q   1

which implies  (; q) = ln

qe
  @f(q)
@q
q+

with solution
l (q; ) =
Z q
q0
ln

q
q + 

  @f(q)
@q
dq
=
Z q
q0
ln(q)  ln( + q)  @f(q)
@q
dq
= q ln(q)  q0 ln(q0)  (q + ) ln(q + )
+(q0 + ) ln(q0 + )  f(q; q0) (8.11)
Substituting equations 8.11 and 8.10 into equation 8.9 gives
L(q; t) = q ln(q)  q0 ln(q0)  (q + ) ln(q + )
+(q0 + ) ln(q0 + )  f(q; q0) +  ln 1
w(t)
+ c (8.12)
Next, we need to eliminate  from equation 8.12 which we do by
giving  a pair of equal values for the same values of l (q; ) and
l'(; t). We thus form the equation
@L(q;t)
@
= 0, giving
ln
1
w(t)
+ ln

+ q0
 + q

= 0 (8.13)
from which, we get
 =
q   q0
w(t)
1
w(t)
  1 (8.14)
Again, substitution of  from equation 8.14 into equation 8.12, gives,
after some algebraic simplifications,
L(q; t) = (c f(q; q0))+ln

qq
(q0)q0(q   q0)q q0

w(t)q
0
(1  w(t))q q0
(8.15)
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resulting in
P (q; t) =
ec f(q;q
0)qq
(q0)q0(q   q0)q q0w(t)
q0 (1  w(t))q q0 (8.16)
Integrability on the probability space, (E; ), requires picking c and
f(q; q0) so that P (:) is a probability measure. Letting f(q; q0) be the
truncated parts of Binet’s formula for reals (Zoltan, 1999),
f(q; q0) =
Z 1
0

1
ex   1  
1
x
+
1
2

e qx   e (q q0)x
x
dx+
1
2
ln

q   q0
q

 q0
and putting c = ln (q
0)q
0
 (q0+1)
, we have a Gamma-Poisson mixture type
distribution
P (q; t) =
 (q)
 (q0 + 1) (q   q0)w(t)
q0 (1  w(t))q q0 (8.17)
8.1.4 Remarks
It’s not unimportant to note that the probability distribution is not
a distribution for time preferences but rather a distribution for in-
tertemporal indifferences. To be more precise, I find a closed-form
distribution for the probability that an individual will actually be in-
different between some quantity of Q(t) = q at time t and a given
quantity Q(0) = q0 now and the individual does not imagine, today,
a future quantity that she feels she will be indifferent to, compared
to a given current quantity Q(0) = q0. The distribution thus cannot
be applied in chapter 5; although knowledge of the exact variability
in the neuro-networks involved in the construction of time in an in-
dividual’s mind could allow for a proper mathematical writing. Al-
though I have assumed, thus far, an individual prespective where the
individual lives forever, societal perspectives are, however, common
recommendations.
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It is thus necessary that I discuss the assumptions under which my
distribution is applicable to society. Two assumptions appear suf-
ficient: first, I ought to assume that society lives forever6 and sec-
ond, I ought to assume that society posesses a societal sense of time
as with the ”average” individuals comprising it. Individuals with
Parkinson’s disease, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder(ADHD)
and schizophrenia have a marked difference in time perception com-
pared to an ”average” individual (Davalos et al, 2002, Levy and
Swanson, 2001, Pastor et al, 1992). The sense of time is often argued
to be a consequence of the dopaminergic state, influencing the sen-
sory signal-to-noise ratio due to an effect of dopamine at the cellular
level (Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1995, Winterer et al, 2000).
Consequently, even the ”average” individual is bound to experience
a marked alteration in time perception if drugs, such as psilocy-
bin (Wittman et al, 2007), increasing the function of dopamine7,
become common usage. Although the latter appears farfetched, an
economic scenario entailing a general alteration in the ”average”
individual’s time perception appears reasonably realistic. Neuro-
biologists and psychologists often make the following associations:
opioid = pleasure, dopamine = happiness, serotonin deficit = depres-
sion, oxytocin = love, nucleus accumbens = reward or amygdala =
fear, etcetera (Kringelbach and Berridge, 2003). Economists, on the
other hand, would coin a bullish or a bearish sentiment, reflecting a
positive or a negative feeling about market trends. A society with a
bull market, a market with an upward trend, for example, might ex-
perience time to pass faster than one with a market with a downward
trend, a bear market, say8.
6I will assume that, through our children, we renew the link that binds the chain
of our humanity through time and attain ”some kind of infinity”. A specific
type of infinity, as an example, here, is an actual infinity if we can assume
that time is an entity.
7While dopamine is known to play a role in both our reward system and our time
perception, norepinephrine and serotonin are also argued affect the sense of
time.
8Bull and bear are the symbolic beasts of finance.
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As such, I assume some ethical9 weights among the preferences of
individuals comprising a temporal society so that we can assume
that society, as a whole, also experiences the passage of time as a
sequence of societal specious presents. Then a society will be in-
different to a single fixed quantity for the duration of it’s specious
present, before feeling the need for some extra amounts, with a so-
cial rate of time preference, srtp, when it perceives the present to
have become past. Moreover, we can also assume non-subjective
rates.
Although, my considerations, thus far, have only concerned a sub-
jective rate of time preference, in the case where rates are not sub-
jective, such as the rate on government bonds, without loss of gener-
ality, the probability of intertemporal indifference for a society with
an external social discount rate, SDR, can be equivalently seen to
follow the same distributional laws as given in equation 8.8 since
the main source of variability is assumed to be in the perception of
time. To be specific, the expectation is taken as given and it is only
the occurance times of events, identified by zeroes or ones, that are
random and assigned probability measures through surprisal max-
imization. So, society’s probability of intertemporal indifference,
P (Q(t) = q=Q(0) = q0)  P (qt; q0) can be represented by equa-
tion 8.17.
8.2 Probability of the futuremonetary value
of health
The distribution derived in the previous section is noted to construct
on the Dirac measure, 1>0(hQ(t)), which identifies an exit from
9The term ethical is used here because of the numerous discussions regarding
whose preferences should count. As we found in chapter 5, educated indi-
viduals generally have different rates of time preference compared to unedu-
cated ones. Such discussions are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.
146
a preference amount q in the interval (t; t + h). Consequently, the
infinitesimal distribution, given by equations 8.4 and 8.5, also satisfy
discrete increments10. That is
P (hQ(t) = 0 j Q(t) = q) = 1  qh
 w`(t)
w(t)

(8.18)
P (hQ(t) = 1 j Q(t) = q) = qh
 w`(t)
w(t)

(8.19)
are probability measures that maximise the entropy in the time inter-
val, (t; t + h) given the constraints aforementioned. Thus, although
P (:), given by equation 8.17, is a continuous state process, we con-
sidered increments of one and allowed a continuous function to pass
through those increments by the use of differentials. As a result, the
discrete version of equation 8.17, is obtained by converting the  (:)
functions to their factorial equivalents, obtaining a Yule-Furry type
process:
P (Q(t) = q) =

q   1
q0

w(t)q
0
(1  w(t))q q0 (8.20)
Thus, for an individual considering outcomes that are discrete such
as the Euro or the QALY, equation 8.20 gives the probability that
the individual is indifferent between some quantityQ(t) = q at time
t = T and a given quantity Q(0) = q0 now given a discount weight,
w(t).
With a distribution for the probability of intertemporal indifference,
it is feasible to make probabilistic statements about the monetary
value of health in the future. We recall that differential discounting
is pedantically establishable provided the monetary value of health
is non-constant with respect to time. Let the probability that an in-
dividual is indifferent between some quantity of money M(t) = m
at a future time t and a given quantity of moneyM(0) = m0 now be
P (M(t) = m) =

m  1
m0

w(t)m
0
(1  w(t))m m0
10See appendix of this chapter for a discrete state continuous time process.
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and let the probability that the individual is indifferent between some
measurable quantity of healthH(t) = h at a future time t and a given
quantity of health H(0) = h0 now be
P (H(t) = h) =

h  1
h0

v(t)h
0
(1  v(t))h h0
where the function v(t) is possibly different from w(t). Given the
current monetary value of health, k = m
0
h0
, we wish to find the proba-
bility that at a future time, t, the monetary value of health will be the
same. With M(t) and H(t), being random variables, the monetary
value of health is also a random variable. Let us consider the change
of variables
Y (t) =
M(t)
H(t)
(8.21)
and
X(t) = H(t) (8.22)
We wish to find the distribution of Y (t). Since M(t) and H(t)
are two independent random variables, their joint p.d.f is given by
P (M(t) = m;H(t) = h) = P (M(t) = m)  P (H(t) = h). Now,
withM(t) = Y (t)X(t) and H(t) = X(t), and the Jacobian
J =
 x y0 1
 = x
the joint distribution of Y (t) and X(t) is given by
P (Y (t) = y;X(t) = x) = jJ jP (Y (t)X(t) = yx;X(t) = x)
which equals
P (y; x) =

xy   1
xy0

w(t)xy
0
(1  w(t))xy xy0

x  1
x0

v(t)x
0
(1  v(t))x x0

x
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The distribution of Y (t) can thus be obtained by marginalizing out
X(t); i.e. P (Y (t) = y) =
P1
x=x0 P (Y (t) = y;X(t) = x). The
computation, however, requiring complex mathematics11, might be
numerically approximated using todays advanced softwares. Alter-
natively, rather than naively finding the solution, one might attempt
to bound the probability, depending on one’s objectives.
8.3 Discussion
I previously mentioned my aim to achieve face validation with cur-
rent psychological theory. Let me discuss the construction of the
probability distribution, in section 8.1, which stands mainly on the
grounds of the philosophy of mathematics. In Particular, the princi-
ple that I have observed, in contrast to Laplace’s Principle of In-
sufficient Reason mentioned in chapter 3, is known as Leibniz’s
Principle of Sufficient Reason. Leibniz’s principle, often associ-
ated with ex nihilo nihil fit12, has been influential in the thinking
of several philosophers and was recognised as one of the four laws
of thought in the 18th century. The principle states that the oc-
curence/existence/truthfulness of an event/entity/statement imply the
occurence/existence/truthfulness of a sufficient explanation.
In this chapter, I have repeatedly made use of this principle. Among
the different senses of the human being, time perception is a sense
that is increasingly gaining the interest of psychologists. Given that
perceived passage of time is not equal to hour-glass passage of time
and that individuals prefer to consume now than in the future imply
the existence of an intertemporal indifference probability distribu-
tion. Furthermore, let us assume that we observe the individual for
an instant, or, say, for a sufficiently small time interval13. At that
11The main problem is the quasi-absolute lack of literature on
P1
x=x0

xy
x0y0

12A latin expression, argued in the first thesis of Parmenides, 5th century BCE,
meaning nothing comes from nothing.
13One could take the standard unit of time, the second, defined to be the duration
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instant, either the individual would have perceived time to pass or
not and, consequently, either there exists an exit from a preference
amount or not; wherefore I obtained equations 8.4 and 8.5 which
formed the infinitesimal distribution. Projecting that distribution
through time, I deduced equation 8.17. Summarising, the derivation
of 8.17 is based on two assumptions; namely:
1. An individual is expected to value a future quantity by placing
a discount weight on that quantity, i.e. E(Q(t)) = q
0
w(t)
2. An individual experiences the passage of time as a sequence
of specious presents.
A point, perhaps, needs mentioning. Another important assumption
that I made is that I have assumed that the individual/society lives
forever implying that a choice can always be made. In case of in-
vestigations involving mortality, the latter can be rectified by taking
into account mortality tables or parametric mortality laws and condi-
tioning the probability of a choice on the probability that the choice
exists. That specification is beyond this thesis since it is more useful
for us to assume that the individual lives forever.
of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition be-
tween the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium 133 atom,
as an approximation.
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8.a Appendix: The Poisson process
Since I used the Dirac measure, let me derive, in similar vein, a
discrete state continuous time process. A particularly important
integer-valued process is the Poisson process14. Along with provid-
ing analogies to my derivation, this appendix shall derive a Poisson
process with intensity ; i.e. a Poisson distribution with mean t.
The intensity (or mean rate or infinitesimal mean) is analogous to
equation 8.2
lim
h#0
1
h
E(hQ(t) j Q(t) = q) =  (8.23)
Note that the parameter does not depend on q or t, which simplifies
much of the remaining computations15. We shall assume that the
possible transitions from a certain state in the small enough time
interval, h, are either no increments at all or a unit increment. So,
from a similar Lagrangian, we find the analogies to equations 8.4
and 8.5 as
P (hQ(t) = 0 j Q(t) = q) = 1  h+ o(h) (8.24)
P (hQ(t) = 1 j Q(t) = q) = h+ o(h) (8.25)
I should also mention that increments that are larger than unity are
here assigned the probability o(h), the Landau order16, which can be
ignored. The Chapman-Kolmogorov equation 8.6 can be written, in
this case, by noting that an outcome q at time t+h can be realized by,
either having an outcome q at time t and no increments in the interval
h or having an outcome q   1 at time t and a unit increment in the
14Karlin and Taylor (1975) provide a thorough derivation.
15Such a non-dependence often coins a homogeneous process in contrast to our
inhomogeneous process.
16The Landau order, o(t) = f(t); t! 0 is the symbolic way of writing the relation
limt!0 f(t)=t = 0. I shall, however, not discuss the mathematical details
here.
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interval h or having an outcome q   2 at time t and two increments
in the interval h and so on. So, we can write 8.6 as
P (q; t+ h) =
qX
i=0
P (q   i; t)P (hQ(t) = i j Q(t) = q   i)
= P (q   1; t)(h+ o(h)) + P (q; t) (1  h+ o(h)) + o(h)
From the properties of o(h), we can write
P (q; t+ h) = P (q   1; t)h+ P (q; t)  P (q; t)h+ o(h) (8.26)
With a change of subject of formula, we obtain the analogy for 8.7
as
P (q; t+ h)  P (q; t)
h
= P (q   1; t)+ P (q; t)+ o(h)
h
(8.27)
Taking the limit h # 0, akin to 8.8,
@P (q; t)
@t
= P (q   1; t)+ P (q; t) (8.28)
Since the Poisson process is a counting process, I shall assume that
one starts counting at time t = 0. So we have an initial condition
that P (q; 0) = 0 for q > 0. Solving 8.28, in contrast to devoting the
whole of subsection 8.1.3 towards solving 8.8, uses a simple trick.
We introduce the function,R(q; t) = P (q; t)et, which we substitute
in 8.28 to give
@R(q; t)
@t
= R(q   1; t) (8.29)
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with R(0; t)  1, R(q; 0) = 0 and q = 1; 2; : : :. Solving 8.29
recursively, we obtain
@R(1; t)
@t
= R(0; t)  ! R(1; t) = t
 ! R(2; t) = (t)
2
2
 ! R(3; t) = (t)
3
3!
...
 ! R(q; t) = (t)
q
q!
Therefore,
P (q; t) = P (Q(t) = q) =
(t)q
q!
e t (8.30)
So, for each t, Q(t) follows a Poisson distribution with parame-
ter t. Our process, given by 8.17, is derived in similar fashion
to the Poisson process since the specious present is a random du-
ration. However, further elaboration of the Poisson example is not
relevant as distributions suitable for discounting would uniquely fol-
low the specifications in section 8.1, with different weight functions.
Yet, the derivation of the Poisson process illustrates some of the key
equations that are obtained. The occurance times of an event, being
the sole source of variability that were assumed, allows for various
other applications such as population growth, arrival rates, etcetera.
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Chapter 9
An Aspiration Avenue
Having a deterministic system of marginals in chapter 7 and a stochas-
tic distribution for each of the system’s entries in the previous chap-
ter, this chapter marries the two and discusses future aspirations.
The future is uncertain, at least, on the basis of the senses we have
been endowed with. The problem of devising decision rules under
uncertainty, probably, dates back to the dawn of humanity. I, how-
ever, aspire to begin this chapter in the early 1700, when decisions
under the conditions of risk and uncertainty gained much attention,
through the representation of lotteries. In the early days of proba-
bility theory, the value of a lottery with a random outcome, Q, was
accepted to be it’s mathematical expectation:Z
all q
qf(q)dq
where f(q) is the associated probability density function1. Conse-
quently, a fair value of the lottery was it’s expected value. In 1738,
Daniel Bernoulli was presented with a case when the integral above
1Accordingly, F (q) will denote the cummulative probability function.
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does not converge2 wherefore the lottery has no fair value3. The
latter would refrain a rational individual from partaking in this lot-
tery, and yet, betters were willing to enter the game at arbitrary
amounts4. This was coined as the St. Petersburg Paradox. To solve
this, Bernoulli (1738) suggested that the value of a particular payoff
was not directly related to it’s precise monetary worth but to a sub-
jective value. He proposed a monotonically increasing function of
q that allowed the integral to converge. The fair value of the lottery
was then suggested to be it’s moral expectation:Z
all q
ln(q)f(q)dq
The suggestion of Bernoulli (1738) was that an individual assigns
a moral value of ln(q) to a reward of q. Although prior to the be-
ginning of the 18th century, decisions under uncertainty primarily
sought the expected value of an outcome, involving solely a proba-
bility function, when Bernoulli (1738) considered valuations based
on the concept of the outcome’s utility, the latter hatched interesting
ideas about using, more general, ”moral” functions.
About two centuries later, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
went about the problem from a different direction. Through a few
axiomatic assumptions about an ”economic” agent with a well-organised
and stable system of preferences, they proposed the Expected Util-
ity Theory( subjective expected utility). The axioms5, presented in
2The case was presented by Daniel’s cousin, Nicolas Bernoulli; both, nephews of
Jacob Bernoulli who is known for the Bernoulli distribution mentioned in the
previous chapter.
3Briefly, the game entails a reward of 2q if the first head appears on the qth tossing
of a fair coin. The expected reward is E(q) = 122+
1
44+
1
88+ : : : =1, and
hence this game has no fair value.
4In contrast to this game, where the expectation at each toss is given, the distribu-
tion I propose, rather, takes an expectation dependent on time, as given, and
formulates Bernoulli probability measures for each instantaneous Bernoulli
distributions.
5Axioms are not necessarily related to time; so T, T’ and T” can be purely viewed
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section 4.2, ultimately gained more considerations over the last few
decades through Ellsberg (1961), Karmakar (1978), Kahneman and
Tversky (1982), Fishburn (1983), to name a few. With that regards,
this chapter seeks primarily to discuss the distribution derived in the
previous chapter, assuming a more general unit of measurement, the
util.
9.1 Utility and aspiration
Utility is an interesting word. Even the founder of modern Utilitar-
ianism, Jeremy Bentham (1789) remarked that his previous works
would have been better understood had he used the words happi-
ness or felicity. A utility function serves to map an ”external” good,
through our senses, to an ”internal” real-valued function of happi-
ness, calibrated by the util. Whether our happiness can be mapped
onto a real-valued function is, however, much debated. Elster and
Roemer (1991) provide a bewildering array of such issues, espe-
cially with regards to interpersonal comparability of utility. The
isoelastic utility function, U(q) = q
1 "
1 " , mentioned in chapter 3,
Bernoulli utility function mentioned above, U(q) = ln(q), exponen-
tial utility function, U(q) = 1   e ac, are a few of those functions
that assign a real value to our consumption, q.
Given a lottery with random variable,Q, a utility function, U(q), and
a probability distribution, f(q), the expected utility of the lottery is
given by Z
all q
U(q)f(q)dq (9.1)
The certainty equivalent, q^, of this lottery is the value of q that pro-
vides the same utility as equation 9.1; i.e. U(q^) =
R
all q
U(q)f(q)dq.
An alternative way in deriving the certainty equivalent replaces the
cummulative function, F (q), with a step cummulative probability
as indices.
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yielding the same expected utility. A dual notion is the aspiration
equivalent, q, where, in this case, the utility function is replaced by
a step utility function yielding the same expected utility.
9.1.1 The Probabulity concept
The dual notion arises primarily due to the dual nature of the very
problem: maximization of expected utility and maximization of the
surprisal, incorporating our state of knowledge. For example, Bord-
ley and LiCalzi (2000), noted that the strategy that we should max-
imize our ignorance6 is equivalent to maximizing expected utility.
Consequently, the expected utility model of Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944) for preferences under uncertainty gave rise to a con-
cept of utility-probability duality (Abbas and Matheson, 2004, Ab-
bas, 2006, Castagnoli and LiCalzi, 1996). Jordaan (2005), for exam-
ple, remarked that this duality is very much ”like force and displace-
ment in mechanics”.
The duality arises because the ”economic” agent, apart from hav-
ing a preference over outcomes, simultaneously exhibits an attitude
towards risk. Consequently, integrating equation 9.1 by parts al-
lows the product to be specified in alternative forms. Berhold (1973),
for example, rescales probability functions yielding reasonable util-
ity functions while Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996) normalize utility
functions into probability functions. The certainty equivalence prin-
ciple arising from the maximization of expected utility, thus, gives
rise to a mirror concept of aspiration equivalence principle, often
associated with Markowitz (1952). The scaling of the utility func-
6The rationale here is that the seat of our experience is within us. So, if we know
nothing about the external, everything external is equiprobable. As we obtain
some information about the system, the entropy represents, in some average
sense, the number of states that are governed by P (:) so that the broader the
distribution, the bigger the entropy. Consequently, maximizing ignorance
should be observed to express an epistemically modest claim; i.e. the proba-
bility distribution should make the least claim beyond prior knowledge.
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tion, for this equivalence, assumes a step utility function, also called
an aspiration utility function, with the same expected utility as the
nonscaled utility function.
9.1.2 The Aspiration utility
The aspiration utility function partitions the sample space into two,
unsatisfactory and satisfactory; i.e. the utility function is an all-or-
nothing function. If aspirations are satisfied, it provides a unit of
happiness, and if not, it provides nothing. Briefly, an aspiration
level, , is first defined. If the outcome is larger than , a util is
received and if the outcome is lower than , zero units of util are
received. The aspiration utility function can thus be written as
U(q) =
(
1; if q  
0; if q < 
(9.2)
Representation of utility functions as weighted goals have been nu-
merous(see for example Uckelman et al (2009)). In the context of
dynamic choice situations, Simon (1955) suggested that binary goals
could simplify decision problems a great deal. Such a scaling and
subsequently reversing the roles of the utility function with the prob-
ability function has recently been done by Abbas (2006) who scaled
the utility function between zero and unity so that it obeys the laws
governing a cummulative probability function. Subsequently, pref-
erence probabilities7 allow any complex lottery to be equivalent to
another lottery with only two outcomes, the best and the worst. So,
defining U(q) to be a normalized utility function, f(q) be the prob-
ability density function and q be the aspiration equivalent of the lot-
tery,
U(q) , Expected utility =
Z 1
 1
U(q)dF (q)
=
Z 1
 1
U(q)f(q)dq
7Preference probability is the term used by Howard (1992).
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= 1 
Z 1
 1
F (q)dU(q) (9.3)
So, under the normalization of U(:),
Expected Utility = 1  Expected Disutility (9.4)
9.2 Temporal aspiration
Definitions of aspiration from dictionaries, however, often involve
an object of desire in the future and, accordingly, I seek to define the
level of aspiration so as to incorporate time. To that end, I analyze
the path structure of the quantity, Q(t), representing utility at time t,
by specifying the instantaneous aspiration utility, hQ(t)  Q(t +
h)   Q(t) in the limit that h goes to zero. I will make an important
assumption for that purpose:
 Assumption: The rate at which we aspire for 1 util in a future
is the same as the (negative) rate at which we discount 1 util
from that future.
With this assumption, I seek a dynamic level, (t), that includes a
delay between the moment that we aspire and the moment that we
expect for our desires to be achieved, t. Defining a general discount
weight function, w(t), we have
@E(Q(t))=@t
E(Q(t)
=  @w(t)=@t
w(t)
(9.5)
If we suppose that the utility level at time t = T is at q, then for a
small enough time interval, h, we have
E(Q(T + h) Q(T ) j Q(T ) = q) =  qhw
0(T )
w(T )
(9.6)
The sole purpose in considering units of the util is that we can con-
sider a vast array of distribution functions at a specific time. Since,
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Q(t) is increasing, Q(t)  Q(t + h) so that t provides an ordering
of the random variables. If we fix a time, say t = T , then we can
define a distribution function, S(T ) = F (Q(T )), wherefore
P

S(T )   qw`(T )
w(T )

= P

F (Q(T ))   qw`(T )
w(T )

= P

Q(T )  F 1
 qw`(T )
w(T )

= FF 1
 qw`(T )
w(T )

=
 qw`(T )
w(T )
So, we can focus solely on probability distributions, without any
utility functions. Consequently, assuming that now, time t = 0, the
level of utility is at q0, and a similar constrained maximization as the
previous chapter, we have the stochastic distribution:
P (q0; qt) =
 (qt)
 (q0 + 1) (qt   q0)w(t)
q0 (1  w(t))qt q0 (9.7)
We thus have a temporal aspiration path in the mirror world of this
duality, where we can represent utility functions as probability dis-
tributions. With util as measurement, from equation 9.2, we can
identify that hQ(t)  U(q) in the limit that h # 0 and from equa-
tions 9.4 and 9.6, we identify the Expected inatantaneous utility gain
 q

 w`(t)
w(t)

. So, keeping w(t) and Q(0) = q0 fixed, the possible
future states increases with time, which is intuitive given our cur-
rent state of knowledge since the further in time the event we try to
predict, the more the uncertainty. Alternatively, if we observe the in-
dividual whithin a small interval, we can claim that some states are
impossible to be realized since the weight w(t) serves to ”regulate”,
in some sense, the flow of surprisal.
At the present time, t = 0, our ignorance is null and we remark that
q0, being given, has a probability of occurance equal to one. With
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different starting points, P (:) admits different measures. So, we
again fix a future time, say t = T which will be our consideration.
Ramsey’s derivation, along with the system in chapter 7, both con-
sider only two time points, t = 0 and t = T . Then, with given time
points, t = 0 and t = T , considering the Euclidean plane spanned
by the axes q0 and qT , P (:) traces a surface in the Euclidean octant
with orthogonal projections onto the plane 2 (0;1) within the up-
per triangle 0 < q0  qt. Thus, viewing P (qT ; q0) as a parametriza-
tion of the random variables, we have a maximum surprisal map;
i.e. a collection of maximum surprisal curves. Regardless of the
surface traced, P (:)merely serves to indicate intertemporal indiffer-
ence amounts that best reflects the current state of knowledge of an
immortal society.
9.2.1 The marginal monetary value of health
We can now discuss the mirror concept of marginal value for society,
through probabilistic arguments. In their first version of Expected
Utility Theory, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) also used a
probabilistic indifference argument and assigned utility values rang-
ing from zero to one. Similarly, the probabutility concept allows our
analyses to be based solely in probabilistic formulations. Then, the
rate of change of a future quantity in terms of it’s current quantity
is derived by computing the relative contribution of qT compared to
q0 influencing P (:). The utility analogy of the latter computation is
equation 3.3. In the dual world, we consider the differential in P (:),
given by equation 9.7, at the point (q0; qT )
dP (q0; qT ) =
@P (q0; qT )
@q0
dq0 +
@P (q0; qT )
@qT
dqT (9.8)
Differentiating P (:) with respect to q0 gives
@P (q0; qT )
@q0
= P (q0; qT )
 
   2ArTanh(1  2w(T )) Hq0 +  (qT   q0))

(9.9)
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where
 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant
 (:) is the digamma function
and Hq0 is the q0-th harmonic number.
The partial differential with respect to qT is
@P (q0; qT )
@qT
= P (q0; qT )
 
 (qT )   (qT   q0) + ln(1  w(t))
(9.10)
Since, without moving off the probability curve P (q0; qT ), if one
changes q0 by dq0, then one must also change qT by dqT so that
P (:) remains unchanged; from equation 9.8, we set dP (:) = 0 and
substitute therein equations 9.9 and 9.10 to get
dqT
dq0
=
   2ArTanh(1  2w(T )) Hq0 +  (qT   q0)
 (qT )   (qT   q0) + ln(1  w(t)) (9.11)
Let us now consider a society composed of only health and wealth,
h and m, respectively. As theoretically argued in chapter 3 and as
empirically observed in chapter 5, I will assume a discount rate for
health to be lower than the SDR or the srtp, say v(T ). Then, as in
chapter 7, where we let our social welfare function be summarised
over money streams and health streams, W (mt; ht), I now let the
relative change of future money in terms of current money be de-
noted by
  @m
0
@mT

dP=0
=   ln(1  w(T )) +  (m
T )   (mT  m0)
   2ArTanh(1  2w(T )) Hm0 +  (mT  m0)
and the relative change of future health in terms of current health be
denoted by
  @h
0
@hT

dP=0
=   ln(1  v(T )) +  (h
T )   (hT   h0)
   2ArTanh(1  2v(T )) Hh0 +  (hT   h0)
The (negative) social relative rate of change of money with respect
to health at time t, defined as
 @m
t
@ht

dP=0
= vt
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then satisfies our theorem, in chapter 7, with n = 2:
(1  vT ) v0
vT (1  v0)
"
@hT
@h0
@mT
@m0
#
=
"
@hT
@h0
@mT
@m0
#
and has solution, analogous to equation 7.7:
vT =

@mT=@m0
@hT=@h0

v0
=

 2ArTanh(1 2w(T )) Hm0+ (mT m0)
ln(1 w(T ))+ (mT )  (mT m0)


 2ArTanh(1 2v(T )) Hh0+ (hT h0)
ln(1 v(T ))+ (hT )  (hT h0)
 v0 (9.12)
Thus, we have a temporal-to-spacial mapping allowing us, with given
indifference amounts for money and for health and a given current
relative change in the monetary value of health, to investigate the
timely relative monetary values. As a numerical example, consider
the case of the Netherlands, with a 4% discount rate for money and
a 1:5% discount rate for health. Assuming a current marginal rate
substitution between money and health to be, say 30,000e/QALY.
Then in one years time, the marginal rate of substitution, given cur-
rent economic consensus, is approximately8 30,000(1.025)e/QALY.
However, time preferences are dissimilar from intertemporal indif-
ferences where I shall take into account the ”difference in the con-
tributing powers” of q0 and qT to P (:), respectively. Subsequently,
with the given current marginal substitution between money and
health, I shall interprete the discount rates for money and for health
as the aspiration rates. Then, on the Euclidean space (hT ;mT ),
equation 9.12 admits relative surprisal maps. At the point of our ex-
pectations,mT = 30000(1:04)e and hT = 1(1:015)QALYs, and we
find that the growing relative value of health, is a lot more; approxi-
mately 30,000(1.065)e/QALY. The latter is not surprising since sur-
prisal is maximized.
81:025 = 1:041:015
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9.3 Discussion
This chapter makes a very important assumption; our aspiration rate
is equivalent to our rate of time preference9. Under that assumption,
it is feasible investigate consistency arguments regarding society’s
aspirations for the future with regards to several commodities, in-
cluding health10. Divergences across different types of commodities,
if any, could be solely represented through probability distributions,
due to the probabutility concept. The notion of probability prefer-
ence is closely related to our ignorance, measured by the surprisal.
It is interesting that, by definition, surprisal is not only a function
of the properties of a system, but also, a function of our state of
knowledge of that system(Note that outcomes are not solely states
of nature). Consequently, scaling intertemporal utility or welfare
functions and using the aspiration levels to trace a probabilistic path
across time provides an alternative way to formulate decision rules
across time. I should, however, mention, that regardless of future as-
pirations, ethical rates should always be preferred compared to the
rate of time preference.
It seems that for such a case, we should encounter fewer problems,
such as interpersonal comparison of utility or other issues argued
in Elster and Roemer (1991), since we can solely observe surprisal
maximization when occurances in time are unknown11. My propo-
sition depends on future wants and their probabilities. However,
one could devise rates for needs, first of all, and, only then, adjust
those rates to allow for wants, for example. Luce and Raiffa (1957)
9This assumption requires further investigation since sequence studies often differ
from time preference studies, as we have seen in chapter 4, and aspiration rate
is novel.
10We already mentioned that we do not regard health as a commodity. However,
in an informal survey, majority of respondents chose to maximize quality of
life for posterity as opposed to maximizing consumption or income.
11The rates of aspiration could be proxied solely by observed growth rates.
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provide an elaborate literature for a one-person decision theory, al-
though we all possess empathetic preferences that govern our ethical
concerns (Hammond, 1976, Harsanyi, 1977).
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9.a Appendix: An illustration on discounted
life-expectancy
We have seen that the spacial characteristics might be derived from
the temporal influences and vice-versa through the matrix-vector
system provided in chapter 7 with the temporal distribution cen-
tered on the weighted future values as in chapter 8. In general, for
temporal distributions, with an external given deterministic discount
rate, it is known that the expected discounted outcome equal the dis-
counted expectation, as a consequence of integration by parts. In this
section, as an analogy, I provide an example for discounted life ex-
pectancy. That is, if a known cohort is observed, the life contingent
probabilities provide an exact mapping onto the time-contingent de-
mographical distributions.
I provide a basic proof that averaging of discounted human life years
equals discounting of life expectancy12. In practice, the present
value of life years gained due to an intervention is evaluated by dis-
counting at discrete time intervals. The interval, generally used, is
traditionally yearly intervals. Health economists generally opt for
three main methodologies, namely discounting life years from the
beginning of the extra life years gained or from the end of year of
each life years gained, or from the mid-year of the extra life year
gained. This section shows that time averaging (i.e. when the prob-
ability density function is specified over time such as the case for life
duration) of discounted life years and discounted life expectancy are
equal.
As a general methodology, I shall treat life gained in this chapter as
a continuous outcome with time with yearly units of measurements.
With data about extra months of life gained, or extra weeks of life
gained, or days gained, one might make the necessary adjustments.
If months are considered, for example, then the outcome would be
12A similar result is well-known to actuaries involved in life insurances.
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1=12 of a year; or if days are considered, then the outcome would be
1=365 of a year. Similarly, for an infinitesimal interval (t; t +4t),
the life lived is 4t provided that the intervention extends the life
through that interval.
Probability
Thus, there is a probability measure attached to living an extra in-
stant, and consequently we will only discount the life of an individ-
ual for as long as she is alive. Let us consider the random variable,
T (x), the future lifetime of an individual who is aged x now, at
time t = 0. To make probability statements about T (x), I will use
demographic notations
tqx = P (T (x)  t)
And
tpx = P (T (x) > t) = 1  tqx
Where tqxis the probability of dying within the next t years and tpx
is the probability that the individual will attain age x+ t. The proba-
bility density function, p.d.f, of T (x) ; fT (x)(t), can be found using
traditional demographical methodologies. That is, the probability
that the individual aged x dies exactly after t years is the probabil-
ity that the individual survives to time t and dies within the period
(t; t +4t); in the limit 4t tends to zero. Sufficient to specify the
survival distribution is the force of mortality:
P (t < T (x)  t+4tjT (x) > t)
=
P (T (x)  t+4t)  P (T (x)  t)
1  P (T (x)  t)
= @=@tP (T (x)  t)4t
1  P (T (x)  t) =
fT (x)(t)4t
1  F T (x)(t)
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Where the function
fT (x)(t)
1 FT (x)(t) has a conditional probability density
interpretation and denoted by (x+ t). The p.d.f of T (x), the prob-
ability that a life aged x survives to time t and dies instantly at that
time is then given by
fT (x) (t) = tpx(x+ t)
Parametric laws of mortality are numerous. Some examples of the
probability that an individual aged x dies exactly after t years are:
1. Constant force of Mortality (x+ t) =  and tpx = e t
2. De Moivre’s Law (x+ t) = 1
w x t with tpx =
w x t
w x
3. Generalized De Moivre’s Law (x+ t) = 
w x t with tpx = 
w x t
w x

with the usual restrictions.
Discount weight
I shall assume, without loss of generality, that valuations are carried
out in the present time. Let us assume, for now, the deterministic
case of t years of life lived with certainty from now. We assume that
an extra year of life is discounted at a rate of, say, r% per annum.
Supposing we discount from, say, the end of each life year gained,
we have a present value of years of life lived, given by
Pt
i=1 (
1
1+r
)
i.
Letting the discount factor per year be w(t) = w 8t, we have
tX
i=1

1
1 + r
i
=
tX
i=1
wi =
1  wt
r
In the case of a continuous lifetime, we first of all need to find an
infinitesimal discount rate. A single life year gained at time t = T
has a present worth of wT . Denoting life years gained at time T by
L(T) and the continuous discount rate by , we have
L (0) = L (T )wT
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! L (T ) = L(0)(1 + r)T
= L(0) lim
4T!0
(1 + 4T ) T4T
= L(0)eT
Thus the infinitesimal continuous discount factor iswt = e t. Plug-
ging this discount factor for the present worth of T years of life lived
continuously and with certainty, we have 1 w
t

.
Equality of Averaging discounted life years and Discounting life
expectancy
However, we have a probability measure attached with the survival
of a life. Consider the random variable Y, the total present dis-
counted life years lived continuously. That is
Y =
1  (1 + r) t

=
1  wt

Then the expected value of the total discounted life years, the ex-
pected value of Y, E (Y ) =
R1
0
1 wt
 t
px(x+ t) dt. But, using in-
tegration by parts,
E (Y ) =  1  w
t

tpx
1
0
+
Z 1
0
e ttpxdt
= 0 +
Z 1
0
e ttpxdt
=
Z 1
0
e ttpxdt
which is the net present worth obtained by discounting the function
of time representing the expected life years,
R1
0
wttpxdt. In such
a case, it appears irrelevant which order we chose to carry out our
analysis; averaging or discounting first. We recall that we used the
p.d.f fT (x)(t) which is tpx(x+ t) : However, tpx, the probability
that a life aged x will attain age x + t is defined as the number of
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people alive, at age x + t relative to an original cohort, l0 newborn,
divided by the number of people alive, relative to the same cohort,
l0 newborn, at age x. Similarly, the force of mortality is also totally
defined in terms of the demographic notations. Hence, the validity
of this section with respect to chapter 7 rests upon whether the p.d.f
fT (x) (t) = tpx(x+ t) maps the current population demography
and a future time t population demography.
Example: Let us take an example of a population with a constant
force of mortality, (x+t) = 0:005 and a continuously compounded
discount rate of 1.5% for a life year. Then, since tpx = e t, we haveZ 1
0
1  wt

tpx dt =
Z 1
0
1  e 0:015t
0:015
e 0:005t(0:005) dt = 50

Z 1
0
wttpx dt =
Z 1
0
e 0:015te 0:005t dt = 50
I would like to mention, however, that intragenerational or intralife-
time discounting is not a practice that ethical experts would advo-
cate. One might argue that a baby’s life is a life, just like an adult’s
life is a life. Discounting the remaining life expectancy of a life aged
x violates the core principles of justice. This appendix, however,
serves to illustrate a mathematical fact that discounting an average
future life, under a temporal distribution, equals averaging the func-
tion of time representing the discounted future life, under that same
temporal distribution. Consequently, I shall limit the discussion of
this appendix minimal.
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Chapter 10
General Discussion
While this thesis argues the need for differential discounting and
proposes a framework for that matter, I fail to provide a theoretically
correct health-specific discount rate. However, in order to remain
whithin ethical realms, a lower discount rate for health compared to
cost is strongly motivated for the purpose of cost-effectiveness anal-
yses; a zero discount rate being also a realistic possibility. Yet an-
other example is the infant pneumococcal vaccination programs that
have been implemented in the past 10 years worldwide, aiming pri-
marily to avert invasive pneumococcal disease in infants and related
mortality. Saving an infant’s life might involve 80 life years gained
(approximate average life expectancy at birth) from the clinician’s
point of view (Rozenbaum et al, 2011). From the health economist’s
point of view, however, applying the broadly consented SDR to the
stream of life years reduces the 80 physical life years to approxi-
mately 20 discounted life years (at 4% discount rate as an example).
Again, this 4-fold reduction in the life years gained would grossly
be mirrored by a 4-fold increase in the cost-effectiveness ratio of
pneumococcal vaccination (Hubben et al, 2007, Postma , 2008).
Equal discounting is primarily supported by pragmatic and historic
motivations, rather than sound evidence and reasoning. The pre-
scription of an equal rate, motivated by the postponement paradox
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of Keeler and Cretin (1983), has been contended with a single ar-
gument; The monetary value of health is not necessarily a constant
in time (Gravelle and Smith, 2001). Fortunately, the expertise in the
area of discounting in health economics is rapidly accumulating, in-
volving thorough discussions, complex analyses and strengthening
alignment with empirical situations. This expertise, more and more,
comprises the specificities of a human life in discounting rules, en-
hancing fair and valid discount rates and, albeit, fair and valid as-
sessments of costs and benefits with different timings, for both pub-
lic health and pharmaceutical strategies. Currently, the Netherlands
and Belgium prescribe a lower discount rate for health gains as op-
posed to the rate for costs and savings (CvZ , 2013, KCE , 2013).
With a broad consensus to discount (CvZ , 2013, ISPOR, 2013, KCE
, 2013), the specific source for inferring and pooling the exact dis-
count rate for health, however, remains obscure to us. Is it directly
related to the real rate of return on investment, the interest rate on
government bonds or the long-term rate of economic growth (Keeler
and Cretin, 1983) or on growth rate of life expectancy or should
the discount rate, theoretically, be based on the time-preference for
health (Olsen, 1993)? Various countries, amongst which the Nether-
lands (CvZ , 2013), have specified in their guidelines that, prefer-
ably, population preferences ought to be taken; i.e. costs, savings,
life years and quality of life should be discounted at the rate of
time preference; irrespective of whom the benefits fall onto and who
“suffers”. Empirical evidences in discounting typically indicate de-
creasing discount rates such as hyperbolic discounting (Westra et al,
2012). The latter has been taken into consideration by several au-
thors; i.e. it has been suggested to apply lower discount rates the
further in the future the outcome. The UK treasury (2013) as well
as Bazelon (2002) and Beutels et al (2008) have suggested specific
numericals for that matter.
With regards to discounting health outcomes, this could imply that,
rather than deriving rates and relations or inferences from rates on
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government bonds, the rates should be directly related to the time
preferences of the population concerned. With our empirical results,
the annual discount rate for health consistently lies below the annual
discount rate of money, with that of health being at least half that
of money for short term delays and this factor decreases to at least
one eighth with increasing time of delay. One might suppose that,
for example, with the Dutch 4% rate for money, the discount rate to
be applied for health would have the same relative decrease1. Such
attempts to near ethics, however, require theoretical underpinnings.
Ratification for an economy supporting differential discounting with
non-constant rates appeared monumental. In order to admit ground-
works in economic theory for differential discounting, I relax the
assumption of a consumption-invariant discount rate allowing, also,
for rates that are not time-invariant. I form a model-consistent ex-
pectation of an n-commodity economywhere each commodity grows
according to their n different growth functions. Using the variability
in the specious present (Valera, 1999), coupled with the expectation
of future consumption given current one, I assign probability mea-
sures by maximising the surprisal. I obtain the probability that an
animal/individual/society forsaking a certain quantity now, will be
indifferent to some quantity at a future time. Although appropriate-
ness criteria for questionnaire investigations are not met, the distri-
bution that I propose might, rightfully, investigate the time until a
compensation is demanded; such as the famous Stanford marshmal-
low experiment (Mischel et al, 1972).
Unfortunately, I remain unsuccessful in devising a health-specific
discount rate. However, in like manner to the calibration of the Ram-
sey (1928) discount rate by setting the objective to be attaining Bliss,
calibration of a health-specific discount rate would entail formulat-
ing an adequate, well reasoned, and ethically accurate government
1Recalling that the third aim of chapter 5 was to elicit time preference for money,
this elicitation is mapped onto the 4% so that the differential rate for health
is devised.
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objective. Vaccination benefits often extend beyond one’s current
generation. Hence, assuming the argument of Diamond (1967) that
social choices, require more information than the total expected util-
ity, as for individual choices, but also information about the distribu-
tion of welfare among society2, I suggest considerations of intergen-
erational utilitarianism. Accordingly, from ethical perspectives, one
could focus solely on surprisal maximization, given current state of
knowledge and expected aspirations.
Oppositions to the use of individual’s own discount rates have been
abundant; Pigou (1920), for example, argued: “The state should pro-
tect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects of
our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over
our descendants. It is the clear duty of Government, which is the
trustee for unborn generations as well as for its present citizens,
to watch over, and if need be, by legislative enactment, to defend
the exhaustible natural resources of the country from rash and reck-
less spoliation.” Since discounting of human lives drastically affects
economic evaluations such as cost-effectiveness of vaccinations and
subsequently future generation’s health, we could see current gen-
eration as having a monopoly over the distribution of health across
time. As Sen (1961) pointed out, if democracy means that all the
people affected by a decision must themselves make the decision,
then there can be no democratic solution to the intergenerational
problem, future generations being unborn yet.
An even more challenging task remains formulation of a health-
specific discount rate with the utopian goal of global welfare op-
timality. The considerations that one ought to take, to that end, are
much more complex. Global welfare maximization requires that rich
countries spend more on foreign lives than on national lives consid-
ering the higher number of individuals in poorer countries than in
richer ones. However, the opposite is observed. Strong evidences
2Society here means intertemporal society.
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were provided by economists( see, for example, Poulos and Whit-
tington (2000)) that rich countries do discount lives of poorer coun-
tries (see Figure below).
-
6
	s = Space
t = Time
w = Weight
ws;t < 18s; t > 0
0
1
Graphical presentation of the implied discount rate where the
axis, w, is the weight attached, the axis, s, being location in
space, and the axis, t, is time. The origin, represents self now
or national now. The hypothetical curve on the Euclidean
quadrant spanned by the axes w/s might thus represent our
discount factor from self to others or individual to others and
might also be representative of own country of residence to
other lower-income countries, for example. The axis, t, is rep-
resentative of time and the curve on the quadrant w/t repre-
sents the discount factor of future outcomes for an individual
or self, or national. The space spanned by the 3-dimensional
Euclidean orthant gives some indications of the discount fac-
tor one attaches to the preference of others through time.
Figure 10.1: Space-Time discounting
Although spacial discounting is beyond the purpose of this thesis,
the derivation of a health-specific discount rate intuitively appears
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to rest upon non-classical utilitarianism. I briefly mentioned the
Rawlsian maxi-min principle, in chapter 7, which is also consistent
with Brown-Weiss (1989) approach. The maxi-min principle is the
strongest in assuring that the least fortunate of future generation’s
levels of consumption are at least as great as those of the least for-
tunate of the current generation (Bruce et al, 1995). With regards to
health, in the absense of technical change, consumption per head is
then ensured to be similar for all future generations. Rawls (1972)
strategy, however, though popular in game theory3, does not build on
a unanimous axiomatic framework; much work remains to be done
here, especially in formulating an economic theory with clear dis-
tinctions between consumer and consumee.
The distribution of health across time being a consequence of our
current policies, is thus very much dependent on the choice of dis-
count rate for health. Assuming a certain allocation of funds for
certain health interventions, labour markets, which are highly corre-
lated to health, are also altered; whether regarding the average age of
the population work force or the number of individuals in the pop-
ulation. Numerous empirical investigations have shown that health
states have impacts on employment, wages and hours worked, as
well as GDP (Bhargava et al, 2001, Pelkowski and Berger, 2004).
Consequently, from an ethical view point, for a country-specific dis-
count rate for health, the maximization problem of the government
should not risk the survival of their sovereignty. Devising well-
reasoned aspirations, in particular, devising sustainable rules, pro-
vide numerous challenges. One such consideration is global debt.
Sovereign debt defaults have been numerous since creditors do not
have a clearly defined claim on the sovereign’s assets (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2008). Debts that have been hidden for several years are,
however, gradually being unraveled. Council Regulation of the Eu-
ropean Union number (479) recently required EU Member Coun-
tries to publish their debt information in an explicit manner. In to-
3The maxi-min solution equals the Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games.
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day’s modern world, it should be noted that if global debts were to
be repaid, not a cent would be in circulation (IMF, 2013). Further-
more, the IMF (2013) also predicts that when baby boomers come
to retire, global working population will be within a smaller work
force percentage than it is now, for many more years to come (IMF,
2013). Ergo, still further work on the topic is required.
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Summary
This thesis first points out the ethical debates around the devalua-
tion of future health with respect to cost-effectiveness of vaccination
programs1. I argue the need to bring ethics in line with guidelines.
Briefly describing how a CEA is carried out and pointing out the
bias for cures to be cost-effective compared to preventions, my col-
leagues and I list some attempts to achieve morally correct CEAs.
However, ethically correct decision rules should also be theoretically
correct2. Theory suggests adoption of the Ramsey discount rate. I
derive the rate and discuss it’s appropriateness for costs. However,
I provide theoretical arguments that, firstly, the pure rate is circu-
lar reasoning for human lives; secondly, the growth rate should be
based on growth in life expectancy and, thirdly, the elasticity for a
life year is assumed to derive from a linear utility function for life
years. I also provide a list of growth rates of GDP compared to life
expectancy, all of which suggest moderate growth in life expectancy
compared to growth in GDP3.
Given the lack of motivation for an equal rate, my colleagues and I
sought to investigate whether individuals discount health at a lower
rate, so we designed a questionnaire that would allow us to com-
pare discount rates for health compared to money, while keeping all
questions, as far as possible, similar for both money and health4.
1Chapter 1
2Chapter 2
3Chapter 3
4Chapter 4
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Next we carried out our empirical investigation on a representative
sample of the Dutch population. We find differential rates, as well
as differential rates among population characteristics such as health
states5.
Given the lack of theoretical motivation for equal discounting and
our empirical results, differential discounting is strongly supported.
Majority of bodies however suggest an equal rate, primarily based
on the Keeler and Cretin paradox. The paradox derives from a well-
known general economic paradox. Koopmans labelled it the para-
dox of the indefinitely postponed splurge”. Not discounting benefits
at the social rate of time preference would cause distant generations
to be utility monsters, due to excessive sacrifice of the current gen-
eration. However, a single argument allowing for differential rate
for health is the fact that the monetary value of health need not be
constant in time6. Given the need for differential discounting, we
form a model-consistent expectation of an n-commodity economy
where each commodity grows according to their n different growth
functions7. Next, I add probability measures to each constituent of
the system by assuming well-known psychological posits, namely
the variability of the specious present8. Following that, I discuss the
marriage between the deterministic system and the probability mea-
sures and propose an aspiration rate9.
Next, I discuss that although I argued the need and attempt to pro-
vide a framework for differential discounting, I fail to investigate the
exact source of pooling a health-specific rate. I suggest that the cali-
bration of a health-specific discount rate would entail formulating an
adequate, well-reasoned, and ethically accurate government objec-
tive. I argue that the primordial duty of the government should not
5Chapter 5
6Chapter 6
7Chapter 7
8Chapter 8
9Chapter 9
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risk the survival of their sovereignty. Lastly, I discuss the Utopian
goal of global welfare such as how health states affect discount rates,
as we observed in chapter 5, and how that affects labour markets, and
GDP, etc10.
10Chapter 10
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift beschrijft eerst de ethische aspecten rondom het de-
valueren van gezondheidswinst in de toekomst bij kosten-effectiviteitsanalyse
(KEA), met name bij vaccineren (disconteren). Ik beargumenteer
dat richtlijnen over disconteren in lijn moeten zijn/komen met ethis-
che argumenten. Na kort stil te staan bij de vertekening door dis-
conteren in KEAs bij curatieve interventies t.o.v. preventieve, geef
ik opties die in de literatuur zijn gegeven ethische KEAs te ver-
richten met juiste disconteringseffecten. Echter, ethisch correcte
beslisregels moeten ook theoretisch correct zijn, waarbij de theo-
rie vooral Ramsey’s discontering suggereert. Ik leid de correspon-
derende disconteringsvoet af en bediscussieer de bruikbaarheid voor
kosten en besparingen, twee van de vier bestandelen van de KEA.
Echter, voor levensjaren (en kwaliteit van leven) is de bruikbaarheid
beperkt: (i) cirkelredenering dreigt, (ii) de disconteringsvoet zou
hier gerelateerd moeten zijn aan de groei in levensverwachting en
(iii) aan de elasticiteit bij levensjaren in de Ramsey functie ligt een
lineaire nutsfunctie ten grondslag. Met name, geef ik een lijst met
groeivoeten in BNPs en in levensverwachtingen, die telkens sugger-
eren dat de groei in de laatste aanzienlijk lager is dan in het BNP.
Gegeven het gebrek aan onderbouwing voor een gelijke disconter-
ingsvoet voor kosten en effecten, zocht ik naar bewijs voor een an-
dere (naar verwachting lagere) voet voor gezondheid dan voor geld.
Met name, werd een vragenlijst ontwikkeld om dit bij personen te
meten, met specifieke maar vergelijkbare vragen voor gezondheid
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en geld. Deze vragenlijst werd - na een pilot bij farmacie studenten
- vervolgens toegepast op een representatieve steekproef uit de Ned-
erlandse bevolking. Daarbij werden verschillen aangetroffen tussen
geld en gezondheid, maar ook bijvoorbeeld indien gestratificeerd
naar gezondheidsstadium of indien bekeken in de tijd.
Op basis van theorie en (tevens bovenbeschreven) empirie wordt dif-
ferentieel disconteren sterk ondersteund. De overgrote meerderheid
van landen, instituten en richtlijnen suggereren echter nog steeds
gelijke disconteringsvoeten voor geld en gezondheid, vooral onder
verwijzing naar de zgn. ”Keeler & Cretin paradox”. Deze paradox
is gerelateerd aan een bekende algemene paradox in de economie,
i.e. ”the paradox of the indefinitely postponed splurge” conform
Koopmans. Hierbij wordt aangegeven dat het niet disconteren van
winsten in de toekomst tegen de maatschappelijke disconteringsvoet
het nut toekomstige generaties sterk bevoordeelt (utility monsters)
tegen grote opofferingen van huidige generaties. Daar kan tegenin
gebracht worden dat differentieel disconteren te verdedigen is va-
nuit een optiek dat de geldelijke waarde van gezondheid mogelijk
niet constant is. Uitgaande dan toch van een noodzaak differen-
tieel te disconteren, ontwikkelde ik een consistent model voor een
n-goederen economie waarbij elk goed een specifieke groeifunctie
heeft (bijvoorbeeld: kosten, besparingen, levensjaren en kwaliteit
van leven). Vervolgens voeg ik probabilistische maten toe conform
gangbare psychologische theorien. In een vervolghoofdstuk inte-
greer de deterministische en de probabilistische aanpakken.
Vervolgens beschrijf ik het resterende probleem dat bij een noodzaak
differentieel te disconteren, de exacte bron(nen) om de voet(en) voor
gezondheidswinsten (levensjaren en kwaliteit) vooralsnog niet helder
aan te geven is (zijn). Deze disconteringsvoet(en) zouden direct
moeten aansluiten bij goed onderbouwde, specifiek gekozen en ethisch
verantwoorde doelen van regeringsbeleid. Tenslotte bespreek ik de
overwegingen in relatie tot het Utopische doel van wereldwijde wel-
vaart; bijvoorbeeld, welke effecten hebben verschillen in gezondhei-
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dszorgsystemen op disconteringsvoeten en vice versa hoe benvloedt
discontering arbeidsmarkten, BNP etc.
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The fact that we devalue the lives of our descendants has raised abun-
dant ethical debates during the past few decades. Economists are saying 
that, because we value the present more than the future, this should 
not exclude anything; not even human lives. In an attempt to bring 
ethics in symphony with economics, this thesis proposes that our deci-
sions depend on what we aspire for. 
